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INTRODUCTION
Remorse and apology are powerful forces in everyday life. Parents
make their children apologize for everyday wrongs. “I’m sorry” is a
common expression, and confession and forgiveness loom large in both
religious rituals and secular reconciliation. When a politician does
something wrong, “a simple, direct apology is often the one thing voters
most want to hear.”1 Thus, political leaders either apologize for everything
from sexual indiscretions to historic injustices or else are criticized for not
apologizing enough.2 People value remorse and apology because they heal
psychic wounds, teach lessons, and reconcile damaged relationships.
Remorse and apology should also loom large in the criminal arena,
where victims’ wounds are the greatest and need the most healing. Victims
and victimized communities have long viewed remorse and apology as
essential elements of justice for crimes. For example, one victim who was
sexually abused by a priest demanded expressions of remorse to help him
find closure and heal.3 Like so many others, however, he had to file a civil
lawsuit to seek justice and apology, as he had received none from the
criminal justice system. In another case, a driver ran over a man in a hitand-run accident and left him in a coma. The driver’s lawyer discouraged
her from apologizing for fear of prejudicing her criminal case. Eight months
after the accident, the driver said she was sorry for what had happened but
did not acknowledge her role. The brief, belated non-apology left the
victim’s family dissatisfied and frustrated.4
When criminal justice does produce remorse, the effects can be
profound. When victims’ relatives confronted serial killer Gary Leon

1. David Firestone, Being a Politician Means Never Having To Say You’re Sorry, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 1998, § 4 (Week in Review), at 2.
2. Firestone quotes apologies by a former South Korean president for abuse of power (“It is
more than unbearable for me to face you and make this confession of my shameful deeds, and I
deeply apologize . . . . The scar will be forever with me in my heart for the people who have
suffered, and for this I feel more regret than I can express.”) and former President George H.W.
Bush (“The internment of Americans of Japanese ancestry was a great injustice . . . and it will
never be repeated.”). Id. He also notes that President “Clinton’s inability to use any form of the
word ‘apologize’ last week in his speech to the nation about his affair with Monica S. Lewinsky
was the aspect of his remarks that was most criticized the next day.” Id.
3. Michael S. Rosenwald, Alleged Victim Demands Apology from Monsignor, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2002, at A16 (noting that victim “said he will feel closure—and the Catholic
Church will begin to heal—only when [the alleged abuser] and other accused clergy publicly take
full responsibility for their actions and apologize”).
4. Robin Topping, Attorneys Balance ‘Safe’ with ‘Sorry,’ NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Feb. 4, 2004, at
A22 (noting that while victims “‘first and foremost’” want apologies, “‘the [defense] lawyer’s
position always is to not make admissions of any kind’” for fear of hurting the criminal case, or at
most to issue a non-apology “‘saying you are sorry that this tragedy occurred, which is not an
admission,’” quoting a sociology professor and two prominent criminal defense attorneys,
respectively).
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Ridgway at sentencing, they sobbed and poured out their anger and loss.
The judge expressed the community’s moral condemnation and spoke of
bringing peace and closure. In return, Ridgway expressed sorrow and
apologized, and at least one victim’s relative forgave him and expressed a
feeling of peace.5 Ridgway’s remorse and apology were no substitute for
punishment, but they helped to begin the healing process.
Surprisingly, however, remorse and apology play little role in criminal
procedure. Our criminal justice system works as a speedy assembly line: It
plea bargains cases efficiently and maximizes punishment for the limited
resources available. This assembly line leaves little room for remorse and
apology. At most, they creep in interstitially, as indicators that individual
defendants are less bad and so need less deterrence, incapacitation, or
retribution. We will call this defendant-centered approach to remorse and
apology the “individual badness model.” As we show in Part I, this
approach dominates existing judicial decisions, such as cases applying
section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,6 as well as the
academic literature.7
We dispute this conventional approach. Remorse and apology could do
much more than serve as gauges of an individual defendant’s need for
punishment. Remorse and apology are fundamentally about social
interactions and relationships. Serious wrongdoers sometimes apologize not
only to the direct victim, but also to everyone who suffered indirect harm,
such as members of the victim’s family and community. Victims, in return,
can air their sorrows while expressing forgiveness to the wrongdoer.

5. Gene Johnson, ‘Green River Killer’ Apologizes, Is Sentenced to 48 Life Terms, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 19, 2003, at A12; see also, e.g., John Donnelly, Appealing for Forgiveness: ExConvicts Reach Out to Victims in South Africa, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 31, 2003, at A1; Oliver
Duff, Sidebar, in Kathy Marks & Paul Peachey, Traditional Maori Ways Translate to a New Style
of Justice in Britain, INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 25, 2003, at 3 (“[The offender] . . . credits [a
face to face meeting with the victim] with saving him from further trouble. ‘It was only when I
shook hands with him that I really felt sorry for what I’d done. . . . [T]hat was a big deal for us.’”);
Grant Wahl & L. Jon Wertheim, A Rite Gone Terribly Wrong, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 22,
2003, at 68, 77 (“[T]he classic bully[] broke down and cried while saying he was sorry for what
he had done to the [hazing victims]. ‘I know it sounds silly,’ says Kelly, the attorney for two of
the victims, ‘but [his apology] meant something to the families.’”) (last alteration in original).
6. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1, cmt. n.3 (2003) (providing two- or
three-level sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility).
7. Up through the mid-1990s, the literature contained almost no substantial discussions of the
role of remorse and apology in the criminal justice system on any but the most abstract level.
Michael O’Hear’s 1997 article marked the first serious attempt to examine how on-the-ground
rules and practices in criminal law treat expressions of remorse and contrition in administering
criminal punishment. See Michael M. O’Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and “Acceptance of
Responsibility”: The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1507 (1997). Since that time, remorse, apology, and
related concepts have attracted the attention of prominent scholars in the field. See infra Section
I.C. The last half-decade has also witnessed an explosion of writing on the topics in the civil law
arena. See, e.g., sources cited infra Subsection II.B.3.
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Ideally, this interactive process teaches moral lessons, brings catharsis, and
reconciles and heals offenders, victims, and society. We will call this multiactor perspective the “relational approach” to distinguish it from the
defendant-focused individual badness model.8
The individualism of the badness model parallels the criminal law’s
individualistic approach to punishment. Traditionally, criminal law has
focused on deterring, incapacitating, rehabilitating, and inflicting retribution
on individual defendants. This focus has come at the expense of the broader
social dimension of punishment. Recently, academics have begun
theorizing about incorporating moral education, healing, reconciliation, and
victim vindication more directly into criminal law.9 Unfortunately, criminal
procedure is artificially divorced from these substantive values of the
criminal law, focusing instead on accuracy, efficiency, and procedural
fairness.10 Thus, criminal procedure leaves little room for apology and
remorse. What room exists is artificial, such as the more or less automatic
sentencing discount for guilty pleas in federal court regardless of how
contrite a defendant is.11
In short, criminal procedure neglects the power of remorse and
apology. To remedy this neglect, we must focus not just on the individual
defendant’s supposed badness, but also on the social practices and norms of
remorse and apology. Remorse and apology are useful as more than mere
8. In practice, the distinction is not always a neat dichotomy. For example, sentencers who
focus on the remorse and apology of individual offenders in meting out punishment also care
about the effects of these expressions on victims and the community. Likewise, victims and
communities who value remorse and apology for their cathartic and expressive power also
frequently see them as relevant to determining sentences. The two approaches we identify shade
into each other, but this does nothing to undermine our central claim that the individual badness
model has dominated the criminal justice system’s stance toward remorse and apology so far.
Our relational model also contains aspects that the word “relational” does not fully capture;
the model seeks to restore victims, to reconcile victims to offenders, to remediate harm, and to
reintegrate offenders into society. For the sake of brevity, however, we use the single but inexact
word “relational” to describe our model. In some fields, such as torts, “relational” implies a focus
on only the plaintiff and defendant. Some might understand this focus to exclude the web of social
relationships torn by the defendant’s conduct. When we use the word “relational,” we do not mean
to limit our focus to the wrongdoer and the victim. While remorse and apology require at least
these two parties, ideally they involve everyone affected directly or indirectly by the wrong.
9. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
733, 762-75 (1998) [hereinafter Garvey, Shaming Punishments] (discussing the role of moral
education in punishment); Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801,
1804-29 (1999) [hereinafter Garvey, Punishment as Atonement] (discussing how punishment
should lead to atonement, reconciliation, and healing); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative
Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 594-601 (1996) (stressing the importance of
punishment as a way to express condemnation).
10. Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal
Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1362
(2003).
11. See O’Hear, supra note 7, at 1534-40 (describing how judges in most federal districts
tend to award acceptance-of-responsibility discounts to defendants who plead guilty and deny
them to defendants who stand trial).
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metrics for punishment. Apology, we argue, is a powerful ritual for
offenders, victims, and communities, one that criminal procedure could
facilitate by encouraging offenders to interact face to face with their
victims. The focus would broaden beyond the individual offender’s badness
to constructive measures to heal offenders, victims, and communities.
Remorse and apology would teach offenders lessons, vindicate victims, and
encourage communities to welcome wrongdoers back into the fold. Of
course, not all offenders or victims would be able and willing to take part.
But the available empirical and anecdotal evidence shows that many would
and that those who did might reap dramatic benefits. Thus, criminal
procedure would serve the criminal law’s substantive values instead of
undercutting them.
Before continuing, we should explain briefly what we mean by
expressions of remorse and apology. We use these terms broadly and
generally, as the law does, to include offenders’ expressions of contrition,
sorrow, shame, repentance, and the like. While these other expressions are
helpful, the core of an apology is “an expression of sorrow and regret.”12
The offender should both feel sorry and express this sorrow,13 although, as
Section III.F explains, even half-hearted or insincere apologies are better
than nothing. At a minimum, apology is at least a dyadic relation and
interaction, requiring an expression of sorrow by the offender to the victim
or victims.14 Subsection II.B.2 delves further into the psychological
mechanisms that make remorse and apology powerful tools for healing
relationships. Our aim is to show how the criminal justice system’s
ambivalent stance toward this cluster of practices obscures and undermines
the key values that they serve.
In Part I, we explore the role that remorse and apology currently play in
criminal law. As Section I.A explains, criminal law views remorse and
apology through the lens of the individual badness model, primarily as
proxies for how bad an individual defendant is and how much punishment
he or she needs. Section I.B shows that criminal procedure emphasizes the
procedural values of fairness, efficiency, and accuracy at the expense of the
substantive values espoused by the criminal law. Section I.C notes that,
while academics have recently shown interest in remorse and apology, most
try to fit these values into the individual badness model. In addition, few
discuss how to implement these values through real-world institutions,
policies, and procedures.

12. NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA 23 (1991).
13. Id. at 31, 36.
14. Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135,
1139 (2000) (citing TAVUCHIS, supra note 12, at 46).
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Part II explains why we should value remorse and apology more
broadly. Section II.A discusses why remorse and apology are poor
proxies—both practically and theoretically—for individual badness and the
need for deterrence and retribution. While deterrence and retribution are
legitimate guideposts for sentencing, they do not exhaust the roles of
remorse and apology. Section II.B notes that remorse and apology are
valuable for broader reasons than the individual badness model recognizes.
Crime is more than individual wrongdoing; it is relational. Crime creates
moral imbalances and sends false moral messages. Remorse and apology
can help right the moral balance, annul false moral messages by vindicating
victims, and reconcile offenders to their victims and communities. Section
II.C ties these insights together. Remorse and apology are not substitutes
for punishment in most cases, as the restorative justice movement
mistakenly contends. Nor are they simply cheap, cruel ways of inflicting
humiliation, as advocates of shaming punishments imply. Rather, they
should be integral to criminal justice, supplementing but not supplanting
deterrence and retribution. Remorse and apology neither displace nor justify
punishment, but, as functions of punishment, they can better complement
and serve its goals.
Part III suggests how the law could translate these ideals into real-world
procedures. Before and after arrest, and before and after charging decisions,
offenders should have sufficient opportunities to resolve lower-level crimes
informally by apologizing and making amends. From arrest through
imprisonment, offenders and victims should have plenty of chances for
court-supervised mediation. Prosecutors could make more use of remorse
and apology to encourage offenders to cooperate with law enforcement and
tell the truth. Victims and the community should have greater opportunities
to participate at all stages in the criminal process, including mediation,
restitution, plea, and trial. Plea and sentencing procedures should include
explicit roles for remorse and apology.
Part III ends with some caveats. These measures will not work for all
crimes and are hardest to implement for victimless crimes or those with
many victims. In addition, not all offenders or victims will be willing to
take part, some apologies will be insincere, and some offenders will lack
the mental capacity for remorse.15 Our proposals may seem idealistic to
veterans of our efficient punishment assembly line. It will take time and
effort to adapt the system to better focus on healing and reconciling victims
and offenders. But when both sides are open to it—and, surprisingly often,
they are—offenders, victims, and communities all stand to benefit.

15. See infra Section III.F (discussing insincere apologies); infra Section III.G (discussing
caveats).
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I. REMORSE, APOLOGY, AND CURRENT CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The criminal justice system is deeply ambivalent about remorse and
apology. According to Austin Sarat, perhaps no expressions are more
“universally welcomed within, and by, the legal system.”16 Judges,
sentencing juries, the news media, and the public overwhelmingly weigh
remorse heavily in disposing of criminal cases and in assessing offenders as
persons. At the same time, criminal procedure does little to encourage or
even allow meaningful apologies and expressions of remorse from
offenders to their victims and the community. Remorse and apology often
lurk in the interstices, appearing only as pro forma statements from
defendants to judges at sentencing. Likewise, expressions of remorse and
apology have received minor and incomplete treatment in the criminal law
literature. Commentators tend to focus on practical and pragmatic issues
raised by the current place of remorse and apology in the criminal justice
system. They do not explore how remorse and apology could play a larger
role in on-the-ground practices and institutions.
In Sections A and B, we examine the criminal law’s uneasy relationship
with expressions of remorse and apology. Section A explains that the
substantive criminal law considers such expressions important mainly for
what they are believed to say about an individual offender’s criminal
disposition. Criminal procedure, however, does not reflect this emphasis, as
we argue in Section B. Section C explores the place of remorse and apology
in the academic literature.
A. The Individual Badness Model
The criminal law is replete with evaluative judgments based on
apologies and expressions of remorse. Newspapers routinely report stories
of victims who demand apologies, criminal defense attorneys who note
their clients’ deep remorse, and judges who cite defendants’ lack of remorse
when imposing harsh sentences.17

16. Austin Sarat, Remorse, Responsibility, and Criminal Punishment: An Analysis of Popular
Culture, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 168, 168 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); see also Scott E.
Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the
Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557, 1557 (1998) (“Few ideas reverberate at the core of the
human psyche as strongly as that of atonement.”).
17. Recent high-profile examples include Sister Helen Prejean’s account of Patrick Sonnier’s
execution in the popular book Dead Man Walking, and the August 2003 parole of former 1960s
radical and member of the Weathermen Kathy Boudin. See HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN
WALKING 244 (1993) (writing that a victim’s father attended the execution of his son’s murderer
because he wanted to hear an apology, not to savor revenge); Charles Lane & Christine
Haughney, Former Militant Is Granted Parole; Upcoming Release Angers Victim’s Family,
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In many of these cases, the presence or absence of remorse, contrition,
or apology can greatly help or hurt defendants. In federal court, for
example, judges reduce sentences by two or three levels for defendants who
express contrition or remorse.18 At the high end of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, this reduction can subtract years from a defendant’s sentence.19
The effect is just as stark at the state level.20 In capital sentencing,
according to one study, a defendant’s perceived remorse can significantly
reduce the likelihood that a jury will impose the death penalty, especially
for less vicious murders.21

Others, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2003, at A2 (“At Bedford Hills Correctional Facility, Boudin
expressed remorse . . . .”).
18. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1, cmt. n.3 (2003); see United States v.
Fagan, 162 F.3d 1280, 1284 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Several circuits have specifically held that a moral
element is implicit in acceptance of responsibility and is satisfied by the defendant’s expression of
contrition and remorse.”) (citing cases); United States v. Hammick, 36 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir.
1994) (observing that “a fundamental principle underlying the acceptance of responsibility
reduction” is “that in the absence of evidence of sincere remorse or contrition for one’s crimes, a
guilty plea entered for the apparent purpose of obtaining a lighter sentence does not entitle a
defendant to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility”); O’Hear, supra note 7, at 1526, 152426 & nn.72-77 (noting that almost all appellate courts treat section 3E1.1 as “fundamentally about
remorse or contrition,” but that in many but not all federal districts, judges automatically award
acceptance-of-responsibility discounts to all defendants who plead guilty). While recent
amendments to sentencing law now require a prosecutorial motion for the third level of reduction,
see Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of Children Today
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(g), 117 Stat. 650, 671, there is little reason to
think that these amendments will strengthen the tenuous tie between “acceptance of
responsibility” and true remorse or contrition.
19. Take, for example, a Category I offender whose offense level drops from thirty-seven to
thirty-four after he receives a three-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility under section
3E1.1. The offender’s sentencing range drops from 210 to 262 months down to 151 to 188
months, a reduction of five to six years. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1; id.
ch. 5, pt. A. As a general matter, a two- or three-level reduction in a defendant’s offense level
usually reduces his sentencing range by about thirty-five percent. See id.; Julie R. O’Sullivan, In
Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ Modified Real-Offense System, 91 NW. U. L. REV.
1342, 1415 & n.274 (1997) (collecting sources).
20. See, e.g., State v. Hinson, 855 So. 2d 119, 121-22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); State v.
Farnham, 479 A.2d 887, 891-93 (Me. 1984); Saenz v. State, 620 A.2d 401, 403-07 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1993).
21. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., But Was He Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital
Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599, 1631-36 & tbls.9-10 (1998) (measuring capital jurors’
beliefs and their correlation with sentencing outcomes in a multivariate empirical study); see also
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“In a
capital sentencing proceeding, assessments of character and remorse may carry great weight and,
perhaps, be determinative of whether the offender lives or dies.”); Eisenberg et al., supra, at 163233 (finding that the “the difference . . . between jurors’ beliefs about the defendant’s remorse in
life cases and in death cases is highly significant” and concluding that, “[i]n short, if jurors
believed that the defendant was sorry for what he had done, they tended to sentence him to life
imprisonment, not death”); Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases:
What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1559-61 (1998) (reaching same conclusion);
Sundby, supra note 16, at 1560-66. As Eisenberg and his coauthors note, the presence or absence
of remorse does not always exert a significant influence on capital sentencing juries. See
Eisenberg et al., supra, at 1600. “[I]n highly vicious cases,” they found, “a defendant’s remorse
may not be able to save him. But in lower viciousness cases . . . , remorse may make all the
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Seemingly remorseless acts by children or adolescents can affect
whether they are tried as juveniles or as adults.22 Parole boards take remorse
into account in making release decisions.23 Contrition and apologies
influence prosecutors’ decisions, including decisions not to charge, to
accept proposed pleas, to enter into cooperation agreements, and to
recommend favorable sentences.24
Why does the criminal law accord so much weight to these
expressions? In the eyes of judges, they indicate that an offender is not
“lost,” that he has some self-transformative capacity that justifies (or
requires) a lesser punishment. To be sure, the language of judicial opinions
does not always express this sentiment directly. Some judges say that the
remorseful offender has a better character than does the unremorseful one.25
Others say that he is more likely to be rehabilitated,26 or that he is less

difference.” Id. at 1636. For a good summary of how remorse can fit into a state’s statutory
scheme in capital cases, see id. at 1604-07.
22. See Martha Grace Duncan, “So Young and So Untender”: Remorseless Children and the
Expectations of the Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1471 (2002) (“In many jurisdictions, the
presence of contrition is a legitimate argument for retaining juvenile jurisdiction, whereas its
absence militates in favor of ‘binding the child over’ to the criminal system.”); Christopher
Slobogin, Treating Kids Right: Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Amenability to Treatment
Concept, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 299, 310-11 (1999) (citing relevant cases and
summarizing the ways that remorse or its absence can bear on the criteria for transfer).
23. See, e.g., In re Smith, No. B157419, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 824, at *33-35 (Ct. App.
June 5, 2003); Silmon v. Travis, 741 N.E.2d 501, 505-06 (N.Y. 2000).
24. See Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement,
56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 43-44, 49-50 (2003) (observing that remorseful, apologetic, and generally
repentant cooperators are more valuable to prosecutors than are unrepentant cooperators); Deena
Winter, Short Sentence Angers Some, BISMARCK (N.D.) TRIB., Apr. 1, 2000, at A1 (reporting
prosecutor’s recommendation of a favorable sentence for defendant who “showed remorse,
accepted responsibility” and offered a “lengthy apology” at sentencing). For some lower-level
nonviolent crimes involving first-time offenders, the prosecutor may enter into a diversion
agreement with the offender whereby criminal charges are continued and eventually dropped after
the offender fulfills the requirements in the diversion agreement. Often, one important
requirement of such agreements is that the offender apologize to his victim and members of his
community for his wrongdoing. See, e.g., Joint Motion To Continue—Diversion Agreement ¶ 9,
New Hampshire v. Doe (Sept. 27, 2001) (docket number and court name redacted) (on file with
authors) (requiring the defendant to “submit to the Court . . . and to the Office of the County
Attorney an essay . . . which will set out an apology to the defendant’s parents, an apology to [the
defendant’s school], and an apology to the County Attorney as a representative of the . . . Police
Department and the New Hampshire community”).
25. See, e.g., Cloum v. State, 779 N.E.2d 84, 90 & n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that trial
judge erred in failing to consider defendant’s “tru[e] remorse” and other evidence of “his general
good character,” coupled with his decision to plead guilty, as a mitigating circumstance at
sentencing).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d 328, 352 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[The
defendant] has repented by recognizing her guilt. She is remorseful over what she has done. She
has also sought to apologize for her crime both to society at large and to [the victim] in particular
. . . . This reflection and introspection is an aspect of her rehabilitation.”).
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hardened,27 or simply that he deserves less punishment.28 Whatever the
precise language, the judges’ point is that the remorseful offender is in
some way changed, or likely to change. Judge Posner expressed this idea in
United States v. Beserra: “A person who is conscious of having done
wrong, and who feels genuine remorse for his wrong, . . . is on the way to
developing those internal checks that would keep many people from
committing crimes even if the expected costs of criminal punishment were
lower than they are.”29
This notion, which we call the individual badness model, dominates the
criminal law’s current stance toward expressions of apology and remorse.
This model, coupled with criminal law’s divorce of substance from
procedure and its neglect of relational concepts, has obscured how remorse
and apology can do much more to heal, reconcile, and reintegrate. The
individual badness model has overshadowed this side of remorse
and apology.
B. Remorse and Apology in Criminal Procedure
While remorse and apology are central to judgments about offenders
and are important to victims and the public, day-to-day criminal justice
makes very little room for them. Society deals with street crime through
command-and-control strategies that consist largely of assembly-line
justice. Mandatory minimum sentences and harsh recidivist laws govern
punishment for many street crimes.30 The focus is on achieving as just an
outcome as possible for each offender with maximum efficiency;
procedures speed cases through to a mathematically correct disposition.31
27. See, e.g., 3 Get Youth Detention in Rape of Retarded Teen, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 24, 1993, § 1,
at 10 (quoting sentencing judge’s observation, upon defendants’ apologies, that “they are not
hardened criminals” and “not without redeeming value”).
28. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 1986 WL 13263, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 26, 1986)
(docket number missing) (reducing defendant’s sentence from two ten-year terms to two threeyear terms to ensure that it was “no greater than that deserved for the offense” in light of, among
other things, “the fact that the defendant expressed remorse over the incident” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
29. 967 F.2d 254, 256 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.).
30. See, e.g., 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 656 (1998) (surveying recidivist
statutes); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS § 5 (1998) (reporting sentencing data for federal and state courts); Darryl K.
Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 1295, 1314-15 (2001) (noting that “[t]he number of people in jails and prisons exceeded two
million for the first time in 1999, average sentence lengths have increased, and offenders are more
likely to have parole revoked for minor violations” and observing generally that today’s “punitive
prosecutorial policies . . . demonstrate a commitment to harsh criminal approaches”).
31. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 2; HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION 153, 159, 163-64 (1968); 1 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 31 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing general purpose of Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure); Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim
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Efficiency is valuable, but it comes at a price.32 This emphasis on efficiency
exemplifies a larger trend. Criminal procedure has come to focus on serving
procedural values such as fairness, efficiency, and accuracy to the exclusion
of incorporating substantive goals into the structure of procedural
mechanisms.33 In the words of William Stuntz, criminal procedure today
“is, basically, a subset of constitutional law,” leading to an artificial
separation between criminal procedure and the substantive values at which
the law aims.34
This divorce of substantive values from procedure is apparent in
criminal procedure’s treatment of remorse and apology. In theory, criminal
law purports to concern itself with discerning and encouraging expressions
of remorse and apology.35 But “in practice, far more attention is devoted to
the prevention and punishment of crime than to ways in which criminals
might be encouraged to repent and resume normal lives.”36 As a
consequence, for all of their resonance with criminal law’s substantive
values, remorse and apology have little room to flourish in criminal
procedure. In some instances, direct procedural barriers obstruct apology
and remorse; in other cases, procedure fails to ameliorate practical and
contextual barriers. When remorse and apology do appear, they do so in
spite of the criminal process, not because of it.
Consider a typical offender—a vandal, maybe, or a low-level drug
dealer, or a thief—in a typical small criminal case. From the time of arrest
to sentencing, criminal procedure pays little heed to his expressions of
Participation Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289, 292-93 (emphasizing that current models of the
criminal process focus on “the efficient suppression of crime,” where “[e]fficiency is the capacity
to process criminal offenders rapidly” in “a factory that has to devote a substantial part of its input
to quality control” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Federal and state sentencing guidelines
exemplify this mathematical trend. See Simons, supra note 24, at 9-10.
32. Conversely, a system that allowed more room for remorse and apology would probably
be less speedy and efficient. Each value requires tradeoffs of time and money. For example, the
system works much faster when the repeat players do not have to worry about victims’ and
defendants’ desires and interests. But because victims, defendants, and communities have
personal stakes in the outcomes, unlike the repeat players, their interests and desires should carry
weight as well.
33. See Bibas, supra note 10, at 1362-64, 1401.
34. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1997) (decrying the artificial separation between criminal procedure
and substantive criminal law).
35. See supra Section I.A. This point is evident in the philosophical theories of punishment
that undergird the criminal law. See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 254-62 (1986)
(explaining that the punisher tries to induce contrition and repentance so that the offender will
repudiate his past wrongful act and avoid committing it again); Jean Hampton, The Moral
Education Theory of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS READER
112, 115-17, 120-21 (A. John Simmons et al. eds., 1995) (arguing that punishment teaches the
offender that the crime is forbidden because it is morally and legally wrong).
36. Robert Wuthnow, Repentance in Criminal Procedure: The Ritual Affirmation of
Community, in REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 171, 172 (Amitai Etzioni & David
E. Carney eds., 1997); see also id. at 179.
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contrition. Beginning with arrest, he enters an adversarial system in which
two lawyers, not the defendant and the victim, are the main actors. Often
operating under staggering caseloads, the lawyers are concerned with
negotiating just and speedy dispositions.37 In most cases, this means cutting
deals on charges, pleas, and sentences.38 In the few cases headed toward
trial, it means investigating, planning pretrial and trial strategy, and dealing
with motions, trial dates, and the like. In either situation, much negotiation
is informal and takes place between the two repeat players, out of the
defendant’s presence.39 These two players strive to balance adversarial
processes, efficient and accurate outcomes, and individual rights. They do
not emphasize mining the possible value of remorse, apology, or
repentance.40
Throughout this process, the defendant has little chance to interact with
anyone other than his own attorney. At their first meeting, the defendant’s
attorney tells him to say nothing to anyone except the attorney himself.
Their few later conversations overwhelmingly concern facts and legal
niceties. Until it is time for the presentence report, any expressions of
contrition or remorse make it only as far as the defense attorney or, on rare
occasions, the prosecutor. Defense attorneys and prosecutors usually view
these expressions as relevant only to the defendant’s willingness to fight,
plead, or perhaps cooperate.41 The genuinely remorseful offender who
wishes to apologize to his victim and make amends usually has no readily
available way to do so. Indeed, from the time of arrest until trial (if there is
one) and sentencing, victims are almost never in sight of the offender.42

37. See, e.g., David A. Starkweather, Note, The Retributive Theory of “Just Deserts” and
Victim Participation in Plea Bargaining, 67 IND. L.J. 853, 875, 874-75 (1992) (noting that
prosecutors must serve conflicting goals, one of which is the “swift disposition of cases”);
Stephen B. Bright, Turning Celebrated Principles into Reality, CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 2003, at 6,
8-9 (discussing overwhelming caseloads of many criminal defense attorneys and resultant
pressures to dispose of cases quickly and “on the cheap”).
38. Guilty pleas resolve 94% to 95% of criminal cases, and most of these probably result
from plea bargains. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463, 2466 n.9 (2004) (collecting statistics).
39. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.9(f) (2d ed. 1999 & Supp.
2004) (reviewing different types of informal interactions that take place between defense counsel
and prosecutors); see also, e.g., United States v. Valencia, 826 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1987)
(recognizing importance of “informal attorney statements” for “plea negotiation [and] . . . frank
discussion between defense counsel and prosecutor on various topics that must be freely discussed
in the interest of expediting trial preparation and the conduct of the trial”).
40. To use Markus Dirk Dubber’s words, “In the war on crime, offenders and victims alike
are irrelevant nuisances, grains of sand in the great machine of state risk management.” Markus
Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 849 (2001).
41. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1356-57 (2003);
Simons, supra note 24, at 50 n.223.
42. See Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims and
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 23 (noting that “discussion of apology is redundant”
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Procedurally, apology and remorse factor in most significantly at
sentencing. Even here, however, these expressions are largely pro forma. In
many cases, the context of the sentencing allocution inhibits rather than
facilitates meaningful remorse and apology. By the time of sentencing,
criminal procedures have done little to encourage repentance, apology to
victims, or coming to terms with one’s guilt. Some defendants in effect
plead guilty without admitting guilt by entering pleas of nolo contendere or
Alford pleas.43 Others contest their charges but are found guilty after trial.
For both types of defendants, cognitive dissonance and continued denials
make it particularly hard to express remorse and apologize.44
Defendants who have fully admitted their guilt and pleaded guilty also
face significant psychological and contextual barriers. Courtrooms are
quasi-public settings, where defendants’ families and close friends are often
present. This setting can humiliate offenders, especially those who prize
their reputations most highly (such as white-collar offenders) or who have
committed highly stigmatized crimes (such as sex offenders).45 Sentencing
allocutions, moreover, are tightly scheduled, hurried, vague, and often in
front of a judge who did not preside over the guilty plea.46 For most
defendants, this is their first real chance to apologize for their crime to
victims or the community. It is no wonder that, when apologies do occur at
sentencing, they often are stilted, forced, or “not enough.”47 Many
defendants simply read from a piece of paper.48
in light of “the dominant adversarial paradigm of the court system,” which provides “no
opportunity . . . for a direct exchange between [victims] and their offenders”); see also, e.g.,
PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY, CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 39 (2001) (noting that, despite
expanding victim-notification rights, victims frequently are still unaware of the status of their
cases). The single exception to this state of affairs is the small but growing number of cases for
which victim-offender mediation is available. See infra notes 139-154 and accompanying text.
43. A nolo contendere plea admits guilt for purposes of the present case but creates no
estoppel, while an Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty while simultaneously asserting
his innocence. Federal courts and most state courts permit both kinds of pleas. See Bibas, supra
note 10, at 1370-72 & nn.44, 52 (collecting federal and state citations).
44. See KENNETH S. BORDENS & IRWIN A. HOROWITZ, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 221 (2d ed.
2002) (explaining that, according to cognitive-dissonance theory, persons who take positions
publicly are more likely to harden their attitudes to keep them in line with those positions even
when real-world events call those positions into question); Bibas, supra note 10, at 1393-400.
45. For sources discussing the reputational sensitivity of white-collar defendants and its
denial-related consequences, see, for example, PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT &
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT—AN ASSESSMENT 11
(1967); and Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White Collar Criminals: A Proposal for
Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 368-72 (1999). For sources
discussing sex crimes, see Bibas, supra note 10, at 1393-97 nn.156-82.
46. See generally United States v. Williams, 23 F.3d 629, 632-33 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that,
with the parties’ consent, federal district courts may delegate guilty-plea allocutions to
magistrates); 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 39, § 26.4(g), at 1231 (describing the defendant’s
opportunity to address the sentencing authority at allocution).
47. See Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 29 (“[A] sincere expression of remorse is . . .
something victims almost never have the chance to hear in the courtroom.”); see also, e.g., United
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Nonetheless, judges heed expressions of remorse and apology and
weigh them heavily at sentencing. As Judge Leventhal put it, “There is a
natural, and I believe sound, disposition to adjust sanctions when an
offender admits his responsibility. . . . I dare say that many judges, possibly
the over-whelming majority, respond in this way . . . .”49 But even at
sentencing, where criminal law actually carves out a procedural space for
remorse and apology, the law focuses almost entirely on the offender. As
with presentencing, context, practice, and procedure reflect this fact. We
mentioned that allocution is often the first opportunity a defendant has to
apologize to victims of his crime. All too often, however, this opportunity is
more theoretical than real. Despite recent and dramatic increases in victims’
rights, victims play minimal roles at sentencing.50 Allocution occurs
between the defendant and the sentencer.51 In many instances, victims are
absent from the courtroom;52 when they are present, defendants do not face
them. Even for defendants who are genuinely remorseful and wish to
apologize to their victims, the colloquy is between the defendant and the
judge. Victims usually sit with the public behind the defendant while the
judge evaluates the defendant’s words and demeanor.53 At most, they read
States v. Purchess, 107 F.3d 1261, 1269 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming district court’s denial of
sentence reduction on the ground that defendant’s “one-sentence apology” was insufficient
evidence of genuine remorse or contrition); Gregory D. Kesich, Suspect Sentenced for Murder of
Friend, PORTLAND (Me.) PRESS HERALD, Nov. 6, 2003, at 1B (noting that victim disregarded
defendant’s apology as insufficient); Monte Morin, Man Gets 8 Years in Charity Scheme, L.A.
TIMES, July 25, 2002, at B2 (describing how prosecutors rejected defendant’s open-court apology
as insincere).
48. See, e.g., John P. Martin, Barber Told To Repay $57,000—Treffinger Friend Apologizes
to Judge for Clipping the County, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Oct. 23, 2003, at 13 (describing
defendant’s reading apology from a single piece of paper at his sentencing for embezzlement).
49. Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see STANTON WHEELER ET
AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 115 (1988)
(interviewing judges in pre-Guidelines study of sentencing of white-collar offenders and finding
that “it is important for many judges that defendants recognize the gravity of their offense, accept
the blame for their misdeeds, and express remorse or contrition for them”); supra notes 19-29 and
accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., TOBOLOWSKY, supra note 42, at 81-86, 92-96 (outlining contours of victims’
rights to be heard at sentencing, in jurisdictions in which they exist, as involving only rights to
speak and present information to the sentencing authority); see also Strang & Sherman, supra note
42, at 22 (“In general, victimology literature makes little mention of victims’ desire for apologies
from their offenders.”).
51. As one leading treatise puts it, allocution is an opportunity for the defendant “to get
across his side of the story to the sentencer” by “personally address[ing] the sentencer.” 5
LAFAVE ET AL. supra note 39, § 26.4(g), at 774 (emphasis added).
52. See TOBOLOWSKY, supra note 42, at 96-98 (reviewing various studies suggesting that, as
a general matter, a significant majority of felony victims are not present at sentencing).
53. Indeed, to apologize to his victim directly, a defendant in most cases would have to turn
his back on the sentencing judge. Darrell L. Brooks did just that at his high-profile sentencing for
the arson of a Baltimore rowhouse resulting in the death of two parents and their five children. See
Gail Gibson & Laurie Willis, Tears and Remorse Precede Life Term in Dawson Deaths; Arsonist,
Victims’ Family Tell Judge of Their Pain, BALT. SUN, Aug. 28, 2003, at 1A (describing how
Brooks “apologized to [Judge] Garbis for turning his back on the judge but said his comments
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brief victim-impact statements or, more commonly, submit written
statements before sentencing, which judges rarely read aloud.54 There is no
victim-offender dialogue and no opportunity for face-to-face apology or
expressions of contrition.
Defendants likewise have few opportunities to express sorrow and
apologize to community representatives. The paradigmatic symbol of the
community in the criminal law—a jury of the defendant’s peers—as a rule
has no role at sentencing, except at capital trials. Trial judges dominate the
sentencing process.55 Furthermore, the prevalence of guilty pleas means
that, before sentencing, most defendants never see a jury. They thus bypass
the traditional arbiter of community values, which in times past encouraged
repentance and apology.56 In those few cases that go to trial or give jurors a
role at sentencing, defendants can address the jury as “the conscience of the
community.”57 But even here, jurors’ role is far from interactive—they
cannot, for example, question the defendant, and the defendant rarely
addresses them directly.58 Offenders determined to express remorse and to
apologize may have to resort to the news media to circumvent criminal
procedure’s barrier of silence.
Context and procedure, in short, discourage the expressions about
which the criminal law cares. This tension leaves criminal law in the uneasy
position of judging offenders based on expressions it has done little to elicit
or probe. It also denies victims, offenders, and their communities any real
opportunity to reap the substantial social, psychological, and moral benefits
that these expressions carry with them. Frustration, pain, guilt, and
alienation replace the potential for closure, relief, healing, and

were intended for the [victims’] relatives” and how he then, “[f]acing a packed courtroom, . . .
went on to speak for minutes about his remorse”). In a few courtrooms, however, the victim might
sit in visitors’ seats that face both the judge and the offender.
54. See TOBOLOWSKY, supra note 42, at 96-98.
55. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 953
(2003); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 314
(2003); Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775, 1790 (1999). Even though the Supreme Court has begun to
endorse a role for jurors at sentencing, they are unlikely to dominate the process any time soon.
See infra note 296.
56. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 & n.15 (1968) (explaining that juries
inject “contemporary community values” into punishment decisions); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 25 (1993) (explaining that colonial Americans
prized the jury trial as “an occasion for repentance and reintegration”).
57. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519.
58. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: PROTECTING VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS 228, 236 (1996); see also John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the
Law of Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1170-71 (1996)
(noting the jury’s “epochal transformation from active neighborhood investigators to passive
triers”).
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reconciliation. This, in turn, undercuts some of the core substantive goals of
the criminal law.
C. Remorse and Apology in the Literature
Scholars have given scant attention to the roles of remorse and apology
in the criminal justice system.59 Tracking the emphasis of the law, many
commentators have focused on the pragmatic, administrative, and
epistemological difficulties of using them as proxies for individual
badness.60 For example, Michael O’Hear criticizes remorse-based sentence
discounts as unworkable and unfair ways of using remorse and apology to
determine how much punishment offenders deserve.61 Likewise, Martha
Grace Duncan and Margareth Etienne both note that remorse-based
sentencing in practice often correlates poorly with the offender’s actual
remorse or blameworthiness.62 Some scholars—including Jean Hampton,
Jeffrie Murphy, Austin Sarat, and Robert Wuthnow—eschew pragmatic and
administrative concerns. Instead, they look more deeply and theoretically at
how remorse relates to punishment, particularly how remorse and apology
fit within prevailing theories of punishment.63 Stephen Garvey goes further
59. See supra note 7.
60. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text; see also Eisenberg et al., supra note 21
(exploring why expressions of remorse influence jurors’ sentencing decisions and identifying
several methodological challenges for the future systematic analysis of the relationship between
remorse and sentencing outcome); Sundby, supra note 16, at 1597, 1588-98 (contending that,
because capital jurors give great weight to remorse, capital defense counsel “would be greatly
remiss to pursue a run-of-the-mill strategy of challenging the prosecution’s case for failing to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before weighing carefully the potential impact such a
strategy will have on the penalty phase”).
61. See O’Hear, supra note 7, at 1542-60 (listing dangers including excessive litigation,
disparity, discrimination, failing to encourage rehabilitation, dishonesty in sentencing, difficulty in
discerning remorse, and chilling the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights). O’Hear argues that
appellate courts should abandon the fiction that U.S. Sentencing Guideline section 3E1.1 is
pegged to remorse. Instead, he advocates the approach that trial courts more or less already take,
which ties sentencing discounts to guilty pleas because these are efficient and spare the system
trials. See id. at 1560-61. Our argument is exactly the opposite—courts and commentators are too
focused on narrow notions of efficiency and not focused enough on the power and benefits of
remorse.
62. See Duncan, supra note 22, at 1472-73 (noting that judges and jurors often mistakenly
view juvenile offenders as remorseless, and contending that these offenders’ denials and lack of
remorse are often understandable); Margareth Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility, and Regulating
Advocacy: Making Defendants Pay for the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2103 (2003)
[hereinafter Etienne, Remorse] (arguing that federal judges penalize defendants under section
3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines by equating zealous advocacy with remorselessness);
Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in Federal Criminal Courts: An
Empirical Study on the Diminished Role of Defense Attorney Advocacy Under the Sentencing
Guidelines, 92 CAL. L. REV. 425 (2004) (same, using a qualitative empirical study to confirm this
claim).
63. See, e.g., Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1677-78 (1992); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Repentance,
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and tries to build a new theoretical framework for punishment around those
concepts.64 Not all of these scholars embrace the individual badness
model.65 But even those who do not, such as Garvey, rarely connect their
views to actual on-the-ground institutions, practices, and procedures. The
one partial departure is R.A. Duff, who discusses in general terms how
criminal mediation could promote apology, reparations, reconciliation,
moral education, and reform.66
Commentators who go further fall into two main camps. The first is the
“apology as sanction” camp. Scholars in this camp either argue for (Amitai
Etzioni, Dan Kahan, Eric Posner, and David Skeel)67 or against (Sharon

Punishment, and Mercy, in REPENTANCE, supra note 36, at 143, 148-51 (discussing relationship
of repentance to deterrence and retributivism); Sarat, supra note 16, at 168-72 (discussing general
relationship of remorse to punishment); Wuthnow, supra note 36, at 174-79 (discussing historical
role of repentance in society’s treatment of criminals and its relationship to modern theories of
punishment); see also HERBERT MORRIS, Guilt and Suffering, in ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 89,
104-08 (1976) (arguing that punishment by itself never can be restorative of personal
relationships, but that accompanying feelings of guilt, contrition, and repentance can provide the
grounds for genuine restoration); B. Douglas Robbins, Comment, Resurrection from a Death
Sentence: Why Capital Sentences Should Be Commuted upon the Occasion of an Authentic
Ethical Transformation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1115, 1140-44 (2001) (reviewing relationship of
remorse to various theories of punishment).
64. See Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, supra note 9, at 1802 (using concepts of
repentance, apology, reparation, and penance to articulate a theoretical model of punishment
“aimed at the expiation of the wrongdoer’s guilt and his reconciliation with the victim and the
community”).
65. Murphy, for instance, recognizes that “[r]epentance may be conceptualized as either an
interior mental act or as an act with an essential social dimension.” JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, GETTING
EVEN 41 (2003).
66. R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 93-99 (2001). Duff goes
on to talk in general terms about how types of punishment, proportionality, sentencers, and similar
procedures affect the messages sent by punishments. Other exceptions include a few pages in the
following: Bibas, supra note 10, at 1368-70; Carrie J. Petrucci, Apology in the Criminal Justice
Setting: Evidence for Including Apology as an Additional Component in the Legal System, 20
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 337, 346-47 (2002); Simons, supra note 24, at 34; and Wuthnow, supra note
36, at 179-84.
Foreign scholars have gone further in addressing how criminal mediation might work to
bring about apology, healing, reconciliation, and reform. This is a significant theme in the German
literature, for example, where mediation often is called the “third way” after punishment and civil
commitment. See Detlev Frehsee, Restitution and Offender-Victim Arrangement in German
Criminal Law: Development and Theoretical Implications, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 235 (1999)
(reviewing history and current state of victim-offender mediation in Germany); see also William
T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A Comparative Perspective on
American Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 37 (1996) (comparing American and German victims’
relative rights to participate in criminal proceedings).
67. See Kahan, supra note 9, at 634, 637-52 (describing the use of apology as a “contrition
penalty” and arguing that such penalties, along with other shaming sanctions, are effective and
appropriate in certain circumstances); Kahan & Posner, supra note 45, at 365 (making a similar
argument in the context of white-collar crime); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001) (advocating use of apology as a shaming penalty for corporate
crime); Amitai Etzioni, Back to the Pillory?, AM. SCHOLAR, Summer 1999, at 43, 44. Additional
proponents of expanding the use of apology as a sanctioning mechanism include Katharine Baker
and Jayne Barnard. See Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663, 699-701
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Lamb and Toni Massaro)68 using apology to punish. Debate within this
camp is a subset of the larger debate over the wisdom of shaming sanctions.
The concern is not with how criminal procedure can promote healing,
repentance, and reconciliation, but rather with whether court-ordered
apology can deter crime.
The second camp is the “restorative justice” camp. As its undisputed
leader, John Braithwaite,69 defines the term, restorative justice “is a process
whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offense come together to
resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offense and its
implications for the future.”70 Restorativists consider apology and remorse
important as part of a holistic process. They hope that offenders will
recognize the wrongfulness of their conduct, make amends with their
victims and the community, and try to restore the moral balance by making
actual or symbolic reparations.71 Restorative justice, however, does not seek
to reform criminal procedure to broaden and deepen the values served by
criminal punishment. Instead, the restorative processes of remorse, apology,
and reparation are supposed to be complete alternatives to punishment.72
(1999); Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
959, 1001 (1999).
68. See Sharon Lamb, The Psychology of Condemnation: Underlying Emotions and Their
Symbolic Expression in Condemning and Shaming, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 929, 953, 951-56 (2003)
(discussing the relationship of apology and remorse to shaming punishments and arguing that
“criminals and other wrongdoers will derive little benefit from wholesale rejection and the ending
of a relationship through shaming acts”); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American
Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880 (1991) (reviewing the use of apologies as shaming
sanctions and arguing generally that dominant social and cultural traditions in the United States
render shaming sanctions ill advised). Norval Morris and Michael Tonry also take this view. See
NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE
PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 5 (1990).
69. Braithwaite is “the world’s preeminent scholar of restorative justice.” Erik Luna,
Introduction: The Utah Restorative Justice Conference, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1, 10.
70. John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, in
25 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 5 (Michael Tonry ed., 1999) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting definition of restorative justice formulated by Tony Marshall);
see also Luna, supra note 69, at 3 (adopting Braithwaite’s definition).
71. See Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 293-94 (explaining the role of remorse and apology
in restorative processes).
72. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Restorative Justice, Punishment, and Atonement, 2003
UTAH L. REV. 303, 303 (noting that proponents of restorative justice “insist on the total
elimination of punishment” and critiquing this position); Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues of
Restorative Processes, the Vices of “Restorative Justice,” 2003 UTAH L. REV. 375, 377 (“[T]he
literature by the leaders of the restorative justice movement make[s] clear that they conceive of
restorative processes not simply as a potentially useful piece of, or complement to, the criminal
justice system, but as a substitute for it.” (citing John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is
Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1746 (1999))). But cf. John
Braithwaite, Holism, Justice, and Atonement, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 389, 404 [hereinafter
Braithwaite, Holism] (suggesting that punishment might be necessary as a fallback “when
criminals eschew atonement, . . . to affirm [the] moral order and to vindicate victims”); Howard
Zehr, Book Review, 43 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 653, 654 (2003) (reviewing THE SPIRITUAL
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II. THE BROADER VALUE OF REMORSE AND APOLOGY
What accounts for this troubling dissonance between criminal law and
procedure? Earlier, we explained that criminal procedure ignores remorse
and apology because it emphasizes procedural values such as autonomy,
efficiency, and fairness to the exclusion of substantive concerns. In this Part
we argue that the criminal law’s misguided focus on the individual badness
model only exacerbates this problem. The individual badness model treats
remorse and apology as yardsticks for an offender’s need for deterrence and
retribution. That model, however, suffers from serious pragmatic,
administrative, and conceptual problems on both an internal and an external
level. Internally, an offender’s need for retribution and deterrence often
correlates poorly with remorse and apology. Externally, the individual
badness model overlooks remorse and apology’s relational dimension.
Remorse and apology are not simply tools for diagnosing the appropriate
punishments for individual defendants. They can heal, teach, and reconcile
offenders, victims, and communities.
This last point relates to a second, broader trend in the criminal law that
has affected its view of remorse and apology. The criminal law views crime
and punishment as overwhelmingly about the individual offender and
applies deterrence and retribution accordingly. In contrast, a rich and
growing body of sociological and psychological work views remorse and
apology as social mechanisms that restore relationships and affirm group
membership. Other areas of the law, such as civil mediation and
reparations, are less constrained by deterrence, retribution, and
individualism and have begun to mine these insights. Criminal law can
learn from these areas how to integrate the values served by remorse and
apology into the day-to-day criminal justice system. Doing so, moreover,
does not require abandoning deterrence, retribution, or bedrock procedural
values.
A. The Status Quo Revisited
Assume for the moment that the individual badness model properly
seeks to discern each offender’s badness and need for punishment. As
metrics for punishment, expressions of remorse and apology do not work
ROOTS OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (Michael L. Hadley ed., 2001)) (“[R]estorative justice
advocates have done a disservice by positioning restoration and retribution as mutually exclusive
adversaries. As a restorative justice advocate who initially popularized this dichotomy, I have
personally taken this argument to heart and changed my approach accordingly.” (citation
omitted)). This last review is an isolated, brief, and recent change of heart, not apparently shared
by Braithwaite, the leading figure in the field. For the most part, restorative justice academics see
themselves as at odds with criminal punishment. See infra Section II.C.

FLIPPED_BIBAS.DOC

2004]

9/28/2004 9:50 PM

Integrating Remorse and Apology

105

very well. Indeed, much of the commentary on remorse and apology in
criminal justice focuses on this fact. We already have outlined some of
these concerns, such as cognitive dissonance and contextual obstacles to
apologizing and expressing remorse in the courtroom.73 One can also doubt
judges’ and jurors’ ability to gauge the sincerity and depth of expressions of
remorse and apology.74 Thus, the justice system may reward well-executed
fakery and the “acquired skill” of expressing “appropriate” attitudes in the
courtroom.75 In addition, overemphasis on remorse and apology may punish
defendants not for their inherent badness but instead for their attorneys’
zealous advocacy or for their own exercise of their Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights.76 And sentencers’ perceptions of remorse may
“implicate much deep-seated racial, cultural, class, and gender baggage.”77
Our criticism of how the criminal law accounts for remorse and
apology goes deeper, so we will not dwell on these problems here. We flag
them simply to illustrate how thoroughly the individual badness model has
colored the criminal law’s evaluation of remorse and apology. If the
internal critiques of the individual badness model are correct, then the law’s
stance disserves important substantive values such as fairness and equal
treatment, and criminal procedure does nothing to correct it.
A more interesting, and for our purposes more significant, question is
whether traditional deterrence theorists or retributivists should be so
concerned with adjusting an offender’s sentence based on his expression of
remorse or apology. Take deterrence first. A basic conception of deterrence
asserts that punishment is justified because it averts future harm by
imposing costs on undesirable conduct. The classic approach to deterrence

73. See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
74. See United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1236 (2d Cir. 1974) (“The effort to appraise
‘character’ is, to be sure, a parlous one, and not necessarily an enterprise for which judges are
notably equipped by prior training.”); United States v. Torres, No. 84 CR 583, 1987 WL 15173, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 1987) (“[T]here is no way to know whether a defendant is truly remorseful
for having committed the offense or whether his remorse is rather for his having been caught . . . .”),
aff’d, 809 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987); Amitai Etzioni, Introduction, in REPENTANCE, supra note 36,
at 1, 9; O’Hear, supra note 7, at 1549-51.
75. O’Hear, supra note 7, at 1555. These difficulties, however, are not insurmountable. See
infra Section III.G.
76. See, e.g., Etienne, Remorse, supra note 62, at 2111 (arguing that federal judges penalize
defendants under section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines by equating zealous
advocacy with remorselessness); O’Hear, supra note 7, at 1556-60 (arguing that the incorporation
of remorse into section 3E1.1 threatens to chill the exercise of defendants’ First, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment rights).
77. O’Hear, supra note 7, at 1555; see also United States v. Vance, 62 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th
Cir. 1995) (observing that “penetrating judicial examination of the criminal’s soul” in practice can
amount to “lenience toward those who cry more easily, or who have sufficient criminal experience
to display sentiment at sentencing”).
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treats it strictly as a cost-benefit analysis.78 To the extent that the expected
penalty for committing a crime outweighs the expected benefit, a potential
wrongdoer will be deterred.79 Remorseful and apologetic wrongdoers, the
basic thinking goes, need less deterrence than do unremorseful ones for at
least two reasons. First, remorseful and apologetic wrongdoers, by virtue of
the pangs of conscience associated with such expressions, “pay a higher
price” than do unremorseful offenders for their wrongful conduct.80 Hence,
it makes sense to lower their sanction accordingly. Second, remorseful and
apologetic wrongdoers, simply by virtue of being remorseful and apologetic
people, are “less likely to offend again” in the future.81 “As a result, the
community needs to be less worried about the offender and can afford to be
more lenient.”82
This reasoning is dubious at best. As of yet, psychology, psychiatry,
sociology, and criminology have not empirically linked expressions of
remorse and apology to a decreased need for specific deterrence of
particular offenders.83 Moreover, crediting the remorseful offender with
costs incurred may well undercut general deterrence of other potential
offenders, encouraging them to discount their expected penalty by the
remorse-apology discount. They may assume that, if they do get caught,
they can lower their penalty by acting remorseful and apologizing. The
deterrent message of the expected sanction shifts from “If you do X, you
will suffer Y” to “Don’t worry about suffering Y if you do X, as long as you
can seem to feel bad about it.”84 Finally, the narrow sentencing discount
from appearing sorry at sentencing obscures the more robust benefits to
offenders and victims of remorse outside of sentencing. Offenders learn to
embrace remorse and apology not as steps to healing and reintegration, but
as ways to lighten their sentences if they are caught.85
78. As we discuss in Section III.F, however, modern theorists reconceptualize deterrence as
influencing the social norms and meanings of crimes, which leaves more room for remorse and
apology.
79. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 170 & n.1 (Clarendon Press 1907) (1789); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:
An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 180 (1968); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition
of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 425 (1999) (reviewing basics of deterrence theory).
80. See, e.g., Simons, supra note 24, at 31.
81. Sarat, supra note 16, at 170; see also, e.g., In re Rubinstein, 506 N.Y.S.2d 441, 442 (App.
Div. 1986); Murphy, supra note 63, at 148-49; supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
82. Sarat, supra note 16, at 170.
83. See Petrucci, supra note 66, at 360, 359-60 (noting the need for additional empirical
studies “to determine whether it is apology itself or some other closely related variable that is
associated or causally linked with reduced recidivism”).
84. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 360 (1996) (explaining how the criminal law’s response to
emotions can alter the deterrent message sent to offenders).
85. See, e.g., Wuthnow, supra note 36, at 179 (“[P]roponents of deterrence point out that
repentance should not be considered in sentencing because the purpose of criminal prosecution is
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Retributivism runs into similar problems. Classical (or grievance)
retributivism holds that an offender should be punished “because, and only
because, [he] deserves it.”86 It also posits that the appropriate amount of
punishment is commensurate with the objective moral seriousness of the
offense. In this sense, classical retributivism is backward-looking because it
is properly concerned only with the offender’s wrongful act and the
circumstances surrounding it.87 But if the conduct and circumstances that
matter to garden-variety retributivism are so limited, retributivists should
not care about post-offense remorse, apology, or repentance. In most cases,
these expressions neither lessen the culpability of the act itself nor mitigate
any physical or pecuniary harm suffered by the victim.88 As Murphy puts it,
“In general, the wrongfulness of conduct at one time will not be affected by
repentance at a later time.”89
One could still justify lowering a remorseful offender’s sentence under
another version of retributivism known as character retributivism.
According to character retributivism, a wrongdoer’s deserts are a function
not merely of his wrongful acts, but also of his character.90 But here too,
real questions exist. On the one hand, the remorseful and apologetic
wrongdoer seems to reveal a better character than does the hardened one.
On the other hand, he also reveals a moral nature that he must have
suppressed to commit the crime in question. Contrast him with the
remorseless wrongdoer, who is simply a “crude and unreflective thug”91
not so much to mete out punishment on the basis of the offender’s own character but as an
example to other potential offenders.”). But see infra Section III.F (acknowledging merit in a
more modern version of deterrence that focuses on the criminal law’s power to influence values
and the formation of preferences).
86. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER,
AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed.,
1987); see also IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 140-45 (Mary Gregor ed. &
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797); IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 198
(W. Hastie trans., Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark 1887) (1796-1797); MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING
BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 153 (2002).
87. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383,
1408 (2002) (“Retributivism limits attention to an offender’s mental state, conduct, and the harm
he caused . . . .”); Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1445 (2004) (noting that
“[r]etribution is often characterized as being concerned with the offender’s past wrongdoing” and
that retributivism generally holds that punishment “should be commensurate to the seriousness of
the wrong and [the offender’s] blameworthiness in committing it”).
88. See Murphy, supra note 63, at 149 (“I typically do not cease to have a grievance against
you simply because you are now sorry that you wronged me; nor do your debts to me disappear
merely because you now lament those acts that put you into debt to me.”).
89. Id. Perhaps mercy justifies lighter sentences for repentant offenders, but mercy is in
tension with retribution because it sidesteps desert and allows unequal treatment. See Markel,
supra note 87, at 1425; Murphy, supra note 63, at 149.
90. See Murphy, supra note 63, at 149; see also Robbins, supra note 63, at 1118 (arguing that
character retributivism requires the commutation of the death sentences of genuinely remorseful
and hence—according to Robbins—ethically transformed offenders).
91. Murphy, supra note 63, at 150.
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who never really thinks things through. Better yet, contrast him with a
wrongdoer who suffers from psychosis or other mental illness for which
lack of remorse is a known symptom.92 These remorseless wrongdoers may
not be as bad as the offender with a fully formed moral personality who
appreciates the wrongfulness of his crime and commits it anyway. Indeed,
the insanity and diminished-capacity defenses exist precisely to give effect
to this intuition: Wrongdoers who do not fully appreciate the wrongfulness
of their crimes—and so are less likely to express remorse or apologize—are
sometimes less blameworthy than those who do.93
If one focuses on individual badness, in other words, it is hard to
understand why remorse and apology should matter as much as they do.
This problem, though, is not attributable solely to the individual badness
model itself. The model is symptomatic of a deeper strain of thinking in
contemporary criminal law scholarship: a focus on the individual offender,
to the exclusion of victims, society, and their relations with the offender.94
Criminal sentencing and punishment have long been preoccupied with
individual offenders. Indeed, “by the 1970s and 1980s, there was a
consensus within the academy that all of the most important theoretical
questions in the criminal law were about individuals: individual ‘selfcontrol,’ individual dangerousness, and individual culpability.”95 One
consequence is that crime is viewed largely as a matter between the

92. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS § 301.7, at 650 (4th ed. 1994) (listing as one of the seven diagnostic criteria for
Antisocial Personality Disorder “lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or
rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another”).
93. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. (1980) (noting that “diminished
responsibility . . . achieves a closer relation between criminal liability and moral guilt” because
“[m]oral condemnation must be founded, at least in part, on some perception of the capacities and
limitations of the individual actor”); Herbert Morris, Sex, Shame, and Assorted Other Topics, 22
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 123, 131 (2003) (noting that individuals who suffer from a mental illness that
diminishes culpability for their wrongful conduct are appropriately viewed as subjects for
treatment instead of punishment); Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of
Mental Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (2000) (explaining that the
purpose of the insanity defense is to help distinguish between those offenders who are
blameworthy and culpable and those who are not). The same intuition underlies the criminal law’s
general ranking of recklessness as a more blameworthy state of mind than simple negligence. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c)-(d) (1985).
94. Compared to private law areas, American criminal law seems more focused on society.
But compared with European criminal law, or with what American criminal law could be, our
current criminal law is largely about the individual offender, his rights, his guilt, and his need for
punishment. Victims and others play minor roles at best.
95. Victoria F. Nourse, Reconceptualizing Criminal Law Defenses, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1691,
1700 (2003); see also Katyal, supra note 41, at 1311-12 (“Most law professors . . . think about
crime as a solo enterprise—a tendency reinforced by the individualist prism of microeconomics
and the case-driven method of studying specific parties.”); Nourse, supra, at 1695 (“Since the
1970s, there has been an often unstated consensus that the proper level of analysis of the criminal
law is at the individualized level of mind or conduct (whether of individual defendants or the
collective sum of all potential defendants).”).
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offender and the state; victims and community have little role to play.96
Another consequence is that the idea of individual dispositions toward or
against criminality drives much of the thinking about how best to control
and respond to crime.97
These tendencies shape criminal law’s stance toward expressions of
remorse and apology. If criminal law and punishment are about responding
to an individual’s willingness to act on his criminal disposition, then
remorse and apology do not deserve major roles in criminal procedure.
Individual offenders, in the law’s view, will be disposed to repent and
apologize, or they will not. Either way, the criminal law, guided by the twin
aims of deterrence and retribution, will respond accordingly. Criminal
procedure will have no reason to focus on encouraging expressions of
remorse and apology from offenders to their victims and the community.
Instead, it can concern itself with the more pressing task of safeguarding
certain core procedural values: efficiency, fairness, and individual rights.
This is exactly what we see in the status quo.98
B. The Broader Value of Remorse and Apology
1. Crime as a Relational Concept
Crime and punishment are about more than simply controlling
offenders as individuals. As any crime victim can tell you, crime also
disrupts status relationships among offenders, victims, and communities. If
you are mugged or your car is broken into, you are distressed not just
because you lose the money in your wallet or must pay to replace your
radio. You likely feel violated and belittled by the perpetrator and his act.
Likewise, the crime distresses other members of the community not simply
because they fear losing money or property. The crime also carries a
symbolic message from the wrongdoer that the community’s norms do not
apply to him and that he is superior to the victim and others like him.
This account recognizes that crime and punishment are as much about
social norms, social influence, and relations between persons as about

96. See Dubber, supra note 40, at 851 (noting that the “person of the victim” has
“disappear[ed] entirely and emphatically” from criminal law, which aims instead to protect
society from “anti-social conduct one expects from anti-social individuals” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Nourse, supra note 95, at 1700 & n.37.
97. See Brown, supra note 87, at 1406; David Garland, Ideas, Institutions and Situational
Crime Prevention, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION
1, 1-14 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 2000); see also Dubber, supra note 40, at 849 (explaining
that the modern war on crime treats offenders and victims not as persons, but as threatening
automata and inefficient nuisances, respectively).
98. See supra Part I.
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individual blame and state-imposed suffering. Dan Kahan has espoused a
similar, expressive view of crime. As he puts it, “The distinctive meaning
of criminal wrongdoing is its denial of some important value, such as the
victim’s moral worth.”99 In Kahan’s view, theft differs from competition in
part because “against the background of social norms theft expresses
disrespect for the injured party’s worth, whereas competition (at least
ordinarily) does not.”100 Along the same lines, Jean Hampton’s expressive
theory of retribution focuses on the messages that wrongful behavior and
sanctions send to victims, offenders, and the community.101 Wrongdoing,
Hampton explains, sends a “false message” that the victim is worth less
than the offender.102 The crime announces that the victim does not deserve
respect and that the offender can instead use him as a means to an end.103
Social psychologists, especially equity theorists, emphasize this
relational aspect of wrongdoing. Equity theorists, in discussing both
criminal and civil wrongdoing, emphasize that “a wrongdoer’s
transgression against an injured party results in an inequity in their
relationship; that is, the wrong creates a moral imbalance between the
parties.”104 This moral imbalance extends beyond the specific victims to the
moral and social community whose norms the wrongdoer has flouted.
Through his transgression, the wrongdoer sets himself off from that
community and sends a symbolic message to it and the victim: He is not
part of the group and does not have to play by its rules.105 According to
equity theory, punishment seeks to “set the balance right” by mending the
breach caused by the wrongdoer and reaffirming social and community
norms.106 An emerging body of empirical evidence supports this theoretical
99. Kahan, supra note 9, at 597.
100. Id. at 597-98; see id. at 598 (“In effect, the thief’s behavior says to the victim, ‘you
matter so little, relative to me, that I can take your property without your consent.’”).
101. See Hampton, supra note 63, at 1677.
102. Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS
CRITICS 1, 8, 12 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992).
103. See id. at 8; see also Jean Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred, in JEFFRIE G.
MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 35, 44 (1988) (“When someone wrongs
another, she does not regard her victim as the sort of person who is valuable enough to require
better treatment.”). Jeffrie Murphy shares this view. See Jeffrie Murphy, Forgiveness and
Resentment, in MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra, at 14, 25.
104. Jennifer K. Robbennolt et al., Symbolism and Incommensurability in Civil Sanctioning:
Decision Makers as Goal Managers, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1141 (2003); see also Elaine
Walster et al., New Directions in Equity Research, 25 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 151, 153
(1973).
105. See, e.g., Alan Page Fiske & Philip E. Tetlock, Taboo Trade-Offs: Reactions to
Transactions That Transgress the Spheres of Justice, 18 POL. PSYCHOL. 255, 286 (1997)
(explaining the ways in which transgressions “throw[] into doubt the taken-for-granted
assumptions that are constitutive of [social] order”); Hampton, supra note 63, at 1677-82.
106. See, e.g., Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 105, at 286 (explaining that punishment is
necessary “to restore the moral status quo ante and to reduce whatever cognitive and emotional
unease was produced in individual[s] . . . by the . . . transgression”); Robbennolt et al., supra note
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account. The evidence suggests that jurors, litigants, victims, and even
offenders in both criminal and civil cases consider this relational aspect of
wrongdoing extremely important.107
Mainstream criminal law scholarship has been slow to incorporate these
insights regarding the relational dimension of criminal wrongdoing into
practical recommendations for criminal justice reforms. But there are a few
exceptions. Kahan’s expressive theory, for example, drives his pro-shaming
stance.108 He has used the same theory to argue for retaining corporate
criminal liability and for alternatives to the traditional crackdowns on
gangs.109 Darryl Brown and Neal Katyal have argued that criminal law’s
traditional focus on individuals has obscured the key roles of social
influence and group identity.110 This insight supports new rules and
strategies to facilitate extracting information from conspirators.111 It also
supports extending cooperative, nonpunitive crime-control policies from
corporate crime to street crime.112 Kyron Huigens endorses Brown’s social
approach to crime. He grounds this social approach, however, not in
consequentialism but in a virtue-based analysis of how interdependent
humans must get along in society.113 In a similar vein, Stephen Garvey has
developed a theory of “punishment as atonement” that seeks to reconcile

104, at 1143, 1139-44 (discussing how criminal and civil punishment restores moral balance by
reaffirming the value of victims and social norms and “mending the breach caused by the
defendant’s reprehensible actions”); see also HERBERT MORRIS, Persons and Punishment, in ON
GUILT AND INNOCENCE, supra note 63, at 31, 34 (arguing that crime involves seizing an unfair
advantage over law-abiding citizens, so punishment is needed to “restore[] the equilibrium of
benefits and burdens by taking from the [wrongdoer] what he owes”).
107. See Michelle Chernikoff Anderson & Robert J. MacCoun, Goal Conflict in Juror
Assessments of Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 313, 326-27
(1999); Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Intuitions About Penalties and Compensation in the
Context of Tort Law, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17, 25 (1993); Gordon Bazemore & Mark S.
Umbreit, Rethinking the Sanctioning Function in Juvenile Court: Retributive or Restorative
Responses to Youth Crime, 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 296 (1995); E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of
the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 953 (1990); infra Subsections II.B.2-3, Sections III.A-B (discussing reactions
of victims and offenders to apologetic discourse in restorative justice programs).
108. See Kahan, supra note 9.
109. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 609, 619, 618-22 (1998) (arguing that corporate crime denigrates societal values and the
worth of victims just as much as street crime, and that corporate criminal liability “repudiate[s]
the[se] false valuations” and “‘sends the message’ that people matter”); id. at 612-15 (arguing that
gang-control strategies that seek to undermine the positive meaning of gang membership are
superior to traditional crackdown strategies, which simply reinforce the perceptions that motivate
gang membership in the first place).
110. See Brown, supra note 30; Brown, supra note 87; Katyal, supra note 41.
111. See Katyal, supra note 41, at 1381-90.
112. See Brown, supra note 30, at 1345-57.
113. See Kyron Huigens, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and Theories of Punishment: A
Response to Brown, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 8 (2002); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and
Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1460-62 (1995).
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offenders with their victims and reintegrate them into the community.114
Unfortunately, Garvey “say[s] little about specific institutions” and does not
“develop any concrete proposals for institutional or doctrinal reform.”115
While these scholars’ perspectives on criminal law vary significantly,
each of their projects recognizes that relational perspectives merit scholarly
concern.116 An approach to criminal law that focuses exclusively on
individual dispositions toward and consequences of criminal behavior is
necessarily incomplete. As David Garland explains, we also must heed the
“cultural role” of legal rules and practices, or their ability to “create social
meaning and thus shape social worlds.”117 This cultural, relational approach
does not require abandoning deterrence, retribution, efficiency, or the
adversarial process. But the overlooked relational approach could
supplement these goals and generate better approaches to crime control.
The next Subsection explains how the relational perspective changes our
understanding of how remorse and apology can and should matter to the
criminal law.
2. Remorse and Apology as Relational Concepts
Crime is about more than “microeconomic concerns with individual
behavior.”118 So too, expressions of remorse and apology are about more
than predicting future dangerousness or determining just deserts. To be
sure, these expressions could offer some insight into an individual
offender’s moral orientation—the focus of the individual badness model.119

114. See Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, supra note 9, at 1801, 1804; see also Simons,
supra note 24, at 33-54 (applying Garvey’s model of punishment as atonement to reconceptualize
the use of cooperators in criminal law).
115. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, supra note 9, at 1804.
116. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 30, at 1352 (discussing importance of crime-control
policies that “aim[] to reintegrate offenders into society rather than shame them in an
unproductive, alienating fashion”); Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, supra note 9, at 1809-10
(analogizing criminal wrongdoing to sin because both essentially are about damage to important
relationships—the sinner’s to his relationship with God and the wrongdoer’s to his relationship
with the community and its members); Katyal, supra note 41, at 1356-58 (arguing that an
effective “flipping” strategy for prosecutors requires an emphasis on repentance, salvation, and
the ritualized return of a wrongdoer to the community of law-abiding citizens). Victoria Nourse
has similarly stressed the importance of appreciating the relational aspects of crime. See Nourse,
supra note 95, at 1692, 1701 (arguing that “[o]ne must look to ‘how people will respond’ to the
law and what relations they will create in response” to understand fully the effect of a law and that
an appreciation of “social norms, status relations, and culture more generally” is necessary for a
complete understanding of the criminal law).
117. David Garland, Punishment and Culture: The Symbolic Dimension of Criminal Justice,
in 11 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 191, 191 (Austin Sarat & Susan S. Sibley eds.,
1991) (emphasis omitted).
118. Katyal, supra note 41, at 1398.
119. Cf. supra Section II.A (noting the practical and theoretical difficulties of using remorse
and apology to gauge an offender’s individual badness and need for deterrence and retribution).
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But they also function as essentially social mechanisms of healing,
reconciliation, moral education, and reintegration.
Apology, expressions of remorse, and other mea culpas are secular
remedial rituals. They both teach and reconcile by reaffirming societal
norms and vindicating victims.120 As such, they are concerned not just with
individual dispositions but also with membership in a particular moral
community. In Nicholas Tavuchis’s words, an apology “is [a]
quintessentially social, that is, a relational symbolic gesture occurring in a
complex interpersonal field.”121 To apologize and repent for one’s
wrongdoing is to expiate, to make amends. It is also to commit visibly and
morally to the norms that govern group affiliation and determine group
membership.122 Genuine apologies and expressions of remorse, in other
words, dissociate oneself from one’s wrongful past and make a plea for
reconciliation.123 They are, as Tavuchis emphasizes, fundamentally
relational. Remorse and apology are thus important to the crime-control
projects of scholars like Brown, Kahan, and Katyal, though the traditional
individual badness model ignores this role.124 Blinded by that model,
criminal law scholars and commentators too often overlook this
interpersonal dimension of remorse and apology.125

120. See TAVUCHIS, supra note 12, at 13 (“Genuine apologies . . . may be taken as the
symbolic foci of secular remedial rituals that serve to recall and reaffirm allegiance to codes of
behavior and belief whose integrity has been challenged by transgression, whether knowingly or
unwittingly.”); see also, e.g., Donna L. Pavlick, Apology and Mediation: The Horse and Carriage
of the Twenty-First Century, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 829, 845, 843-46 (2003) (“Apology
dispels the perception that the victim is being ignored [and] validates the victim.” (citation
omitted)); Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in
Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 461, 461 (1986) (characterizing apology as
“a crucial element in the recognition and restoration of human relationship”); infra Section II.C.
121. TAVUCHIS, supra note 12, at 14; see also id. at 7 (noting the “essential relational
character of apology”); Petrucci, supra note 66, at 343 (noting that an “interpersonal orientation,”
“stress[ing] a concern for the relationship between the victim and offender,” is “a key ingredient”
in an effective apology (internal quotation marks omitted)).
122. See, e.g., Luna, supra note 71, at 294 (“Genuine remorse . . . signals the offender’s
affirmation of the legal norms of a community and his desire to be part of legitimate society.”);
Pavlick, supra note 120, at 846 (discussing how remorse and apology “emphasize[] and
reinforce[] the human values implicit to membership or ‘recertification’ in any moral community”
(citation omitted)).
123. See, e.g., Taft, supra note 14, at 1140 (explaining how an apologetic offender, while
accepting responsibility for his actions, also commits himself to repent for his wrongful ways);
Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 120, at 475 (“An apology suggests change in attitude when the
apologizer expresses remorse for past hurt and the commitment that future behavior will not be
hostile and will make up for the rupture in relationship created by the hurtful act. . . . [A]n
apologizing individual splits herself into two parts, the part that is guilty of an offense and the part
that disassociates itself from the delict and affirms a belief in the offended rule.”).
124. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 41, at 1316 (predicating project on “influential
[psychological] research [that] focuses on how group membership changes an individual’s
personal identity to produce a new social identity”).
125. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
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Sociologists, social psychologists, and scholars in other fields of law do
not ignore this relational dimension. A rich and growing body of literature
explores how remorse and apology build social norms, educate, and repair
breaches in communities and relationships caused by wrongdoing.126 A
broad consensus now supports Tavuchis’s central point: Because remorse
and apology are fundamentally relational, any apologetic discourse must be
“dyadic,” reflecting “an interaction between the primordial social categories
of Offender and Offended.”127 Contrite offenders, in other words, do not
just apologize for something. They also apologize to someone—their
victims, their community, their family and their friends.128 Only by doing so
can the remorseful offender “seek[] to re-affirm shared values with the
receiver[] and look[] for re-certification of membership in the moral
community.”129 And only in this way can the victim and others hurt by the
wrong experience healing.130
For this reason, many commentators view a face-to-face interaction
between offender and offended as essential to effective expressions of
remorse and apology. As Erin O’Hara and Douglas Yarn explain, “Remorse
and its accompanying sorrow are often conveyed with body language and
facial expression in face-to-face apologies.”131 These interactions allow
nuanced communication that contextualizes the offender’s crime and the

126. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 120 and infra Subsection II.B.3 (examining the
increasing attention to apology in civil mediation). Prior to Tavuchis’s work, only Wagatsuma and
Rosett, in their comparative study of the role and uses of apology in Japan and United States, see
Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 120, had critically examined the importance of expressions of
remorse and apology to social norms and the reconciliation of transgressors to their victims and
communities. Hence Tavuchis, whose work appeared in 1991, noted that, in his attempt to explore
the “wide[] social import” of apology, “[a]n extensive search of diverse sources, including
anthropology, psychology, law, diplomacy, etiquette manuals, and literature . . . was not, for the
most part, fruitful.” TAVUCHIS, supra note 12, at 3. Moreover, “sociology . . . and linguistics . . .
had little to offer in the way of a sustained analysis of the essentials, forms, and functions of
apology.” Id.
127. TAVUCHIS, supra note 12, at 46 (emphasis omitted); see also Taft, supra note 14, at
1139.
128. See TAVUCHIS, supra note 12, at 47 (“[A]pology is a relational concept and practice that
necessarily requires an individual or collective Other to realize itself.”); Taft, supra note 14, at
1142-43 (“[A]pology does not exist in isolation; it is, rather, an intensely relational process that
cannot be understood alone any more than a promise could be understood without reference to
promisor and promisee.”).
129. Pavlick, supra note 120, at 836 (citations omitted); see also DUFF, supra note 66, at 114
(arguing that a wrongdoer owes an apology not only to the direct victim of the crime but also to
the community as a whole, “for the wrong done to the individual victim is also a wrong against
the community, which shares that wrong and whose values have been flouted”).
130. See infra notes 147-152 and accompanying text.
131. Erin Ann O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV.
1121, 1134-35 (2002); see id. at 1135 (“More distant apologies often require explicit, and perhaps
more extreme, statements of sorrow and regret.”); see also Petrucci, supra note 66, at 343 (noting
that face-to-face interactions are central to effective apologies); Strang & Sherman, supra note
42, at 28.
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harm done.132 An offender “cannot simply rationalize the crime as being
minor or harmless when a real person stands in front of him describing the
physical and emotional pain directly flowing from his behavior.”133 By
humanizing the transgression and its consequences, face-to-face interaction
can break down pride, fear, pain, anxiety, and other barriers to accepting
responsibility and thus pave the way for genuine repentance.134 Offenders
can come to see that their crimes had real-world consequences and that their
victims want and need to understand why the crime happened.135 Victims,
likewise, can learn why the crime happened, receive needed assurance that
it was not their fault, overcome their resentment, and see offenders as
redeemable human beings.136 The entire process can provide a starting point
for forgiveness and reintegration.137
When offenders express genuine remorse in person to those offended,
the effects can be profound.138 The news media and popular press are full of

132. See Kathy Elton & Michelle M. Roybal, Restoration, A Component of Justice, 2003
UTAH L. REV. 43, 54 (observing that storytelling and dialogue between a victim and an offender
can result in “obtaining a greater understanding of each other’s perspective through forthright and
emotionally-intense dialogue”); see also Mark W. Bakker, Comment, Repairing the Breach and
Reconciling the Discordant: Mediation in the Criminal Justice System, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1479,
1483-90 (1984).
133. Luna, supra note 71, at 300.
134. See Garvey, supra note 72, at 314-15 (explaining that apologetic discourse between an
offender and his victim can “bring an offender to understand and appreciate the full measure of
the damage he has caused . . . [and] enable him to overcome mechanisms of defense and denial”
and that “[t]he moral education and awakening of the offender that ideally takes place . . . is thus
the offender’s first step on the road to atonement”); Luna, supra note 71, at 300 (“[T]he presence
of the victim and his articulation of the harm he has suffered frustrate an offender’s attempt to
neutralize the offense.”); Taft, supra note 14, at 1142; infra notes 138-154 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 72, at 314 (explaining that an offender’s face-to-face
meeting with his victim “brings home to the offender in painful detail the full measure of the
injury he has caused” and allows him “to see his victim as a human being with standing equal to
his own”); Luna, supra note 71, at 300 (explaining that an offender’s communication of genuine
remorse to the victim in a face-to-face conference conveys his “respect for the victim . . . and
validation of the right not to be victimized”).
136. See, e.g., Luna, supra note 71, at 300 (noting that an offender’s communication of
genuine remorse to the victim in a face-to-face conference allows the victim to develop “respect
for the offender as an individual capable of feeling positive emotions and taking responsibility for
his actions”); Pavlick, supra note 120, at 845 (“Apology dispels the perception that the victim is
being ignored [and] validates the victim.” (citation omitted)); Petrucci, supra note 66, at 343
(noting that a face-to-face interaction “allows the victim to no longer feel shame because the
victim sees . . . that it is the offender who is responsible for the harmful act, and not the victim”).
137. See Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, supra note 9, at 1840 (“[O]nce an offender has
done everything possible to atone for his wrong, the burden shifts to the victim to forgive.”); Peter
H. Rehm & Denise R. Beatty, Legal Consequences of Apologizing, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 116
(“A sincere apology . . . can heal humiliation and generate forgiveness.”); Taft, supra note 14, at
1142 (“[A]n apology sets in motion a call to the offended, a call for forgiveness.”).
138. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients To Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009,
1044 (1999) (noting that “[m]any practitioners report that apologies often work ‘magic’ or
‘miracles,’” that “often an apology triggers like conduct from the recipient,” and that “even when
one is highly skeptical that an apology will ‘do any good,’ it often does”); Garvey, Shaming
Punishments, supra note 9, at 792 (discussing the “almost magical character” of genuine
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stories about the transformative effects of such meetings. Empirical studies
and anecdotal evidence from restorative justice programs confirm that faceto-face expressions of remorse and apology matter immensely to offenders
and victims. Four empirical studies involving 550 offenders found that 74%
of offenders apologized when given the opportunity to do so in restorativejustice conferences.139 By contrast, 71% of offenders whose only
opportunity to apologize came in the courtroom did not do so.140 According
to these studies, offenders who took part in restorative-justice conferences
were 6.9 times more likely to apologize than those who went to court, and
victims were 2.6 times more likely to forgive them.141 Offenders who have
the opportunity to meet with victims often apologize even when they start
off vowing not to.142 In return, many victims accept the apologies and
forgive.143 Numerous studies show that a substantial percentage of victims
want to meet with offenders.144 “The [empirical] evidence suggests that
victims see emotional reconciliation to be far more important than material
or financial reparation.”145 According to one study, the more that victims
are emotionally upset by the offense, the more they want to meet with
offenders.146
Victims, offenders, and community members who have met and
engaged in apologetic discourse overwhelmingly feel satisfied and relieved.
Offenders who were interviewed, for example, reported feeling “happy,
apologies); Pavlick, supra note 120, at 846 (observing that the effect of an apology “on the human
condition often can be magical”).
139. Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A Review of Empirical Research on the Psychological
Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 167, 189; see also O’Hara & Yarn, supra
note 131, at 1123 (“Wrongdoers often want to be forgiven, and concomitantly, may feel an urge to
apologize.”).
140. Poulson, supra note 139, at 189.
141. Id. (describing the differences between restorative-justice and court participants as
“consistently large” and statistically significant across all four studies).
142. See Diane Whiteley, The Victim and the Justification of Punishment, CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1998, at 42, 51.
143. Id.
144. Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 17-23.
145. Id. at 22; cf. Daniel W. Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, 83 JUDICATURE 180,
185 (2000) (noting that in a study of the experiences of victims of sexual assault with civil
litigation and government compensation, most of the claimants stated they were pursuing their
claim out of a “desire to be heard, have their experience validated, and receive an apology”).
146. JOANNA MATTINSON & CATRIONA MIRRLEES-BLACK, HOME OFFICE, RESEARCH
STUDY NO. 200, ATTITUDES TO CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: FINDINGS FROM THE 1998
BRITISH CRIME SURVEY 43 (2000), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/hors200.pdf; see also
Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1199 (1997)
(“[A]pology has proven much more effective in major criminal mediations, where the injury was
horribly severe, than in commercial contract cases, where the injury may be regarded as less
serious.” (footnote omitted)). For an excellent overview and summary of the available evidence on
the role of and importance to victims and offenders of apologies in face-to-face meetings, see
MARK S. UMBREIT ET AL., RESTORATIVE JUSTICE DIALOGUE: ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF
EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON
MEDIATION,
CONFERENCING AND CIRCLES (2003),
http://2ssw.che.umn.edu/rjp/Resources/Documents/RJAnnotations%20June%202003.pdf.
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because all my feelings were out.”147 They “liked being able to apologize”
“[t]o let [the victim] know that we are not bad.”148 They “fe[lt] better”
because they “knew it was settled,” and felt “it was important to tell the
victim that the crime was not personal and that [the offender] was sorry.”149
Offenders welcomed the chance to “explain their own behavior, apologize,
ease their consciences and reduce feelings of guilt.”150 Victims, likewise,
felt they had been given “a chance for healing[,] a chance for informationsharing[,] a chance for building relationships instead of destroying them.”151
They explained that “it’s a healing-type thing” and that they were able to
“get over [their] sense of loss.”152
While preliminary studies are encouraging, it is still too early to be sure
precisely how these opportunities affect long-term recidivism rates. But
empirical studies of restorative justice programs show that they control
crime at least as well, if not better than, traditional criminal justice.153 And
they bring the added benefits of vindicating victims, healing and
reconciling victims and offenders, reaffirming social norms, and morally
educating offenders and citizens. Though criminal procedure often overlooks
these values, they are of fundamental importance to the criminal law.154

147. MARK S. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF
AND MEDIATION 101 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).

RESTORATIVE JUSTICE

148. Id. at 104 (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Caren L. Flaten, Victim-Offender Mediation: Application with Serious Offenses
Committed by Juveniles, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 387, 396
(Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
150. Lutz Netzig & Thomas Trenczek, Restorative Justice as Participation: Theory, Law,
Experience and Research, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 149, at 241, 256 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
151. UMBREIT, supra note 147, at 95 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Poulson,
supra note 139, at 189 (noting that offenders’ apologies “can have particularly important
psychological benefits to . . . victims”); Shuman, supra note 145, at 189 (“Although limited, the
available theoretical, anecdotal, and empirical evidence all point[s] to the therapeutic potential of
apology. Our consistent experience is that apologies are often an important part of the healing
process.”); Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 33 (reporting research from a restorative justice
study showing that the number of victims who felt that participation in a restorative process
involving the potential for apologetic discourse with the offender had allowed them to achieve
closure and put the crime behind them outweighed those who did not by three to one).
152. Elizabeth Latif, Note, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored Toward Legal
Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REV. 289, 294 (2001) (quoting UMBREIT, supra note 147, at 95) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
153. Strang and Sherman, for example, surveying much of the existing evidence from
restorative justice, conclude that restorative justice has always worked either as well as or, in
some cases, clearly better than more traditional prosecution methods in controlling repeat
offending. See Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 38. They further note that “[t]he evidence to
date consistently falsifies,” and that “[a]ll of the available evidence contradicts,” the notion that an
emphasis on restorative processes as opposed to traditional command-and-control measures will
lead to more crime. Id. at 38, 41; see also UMBREIT ET AL., supra note 146, at 2-3, 7, 9, 11, 15, 18,
21-22, 25, 30, 32-33, 35, 38, 40-41, 44 (summarizing studies addressing recidivism). Section III.B
addresses the recidivism question in more detail.
154. See supra Section I.A.
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Of course, remorse and apology are not panaceas for the problems of
crime control and the distress, pain, disrupted relationships, and other
effects of crime. Expressing remorse and apologizing can be extremely
difficult for offenders for any number of reasons. Tavuchis observes that
such expressions can be “as painful and devastating as, if not worse than,
any form of physical retribution.”155 Apologies can go wrong.156 Not all
offenders are remorseful or willing to turn toward genuine repentance. Not
all victims or community members want to hear an apology or meet an
offender face to face.157 In most cases, victims do not view apologies as
substitutes for punishment, as we discuss in Section II.C.158 Some apologies
are half-hearted or insincere. And when parties do meet, some inevitably
come away feeling dissatisfied.159 Nonetheless, remorse and apology are
more than mere evidence of an offender’s true character, or reasons for a
sentence reduction, or even creative sanctioning mechanisms. Ideally, they
should be integral parts of criminal procedure, serving relational values and
not just deterrence and retribution. In fact, even feigned expressions of
remorse and apology can serve many of these values, as Section III.F
discusses. Viewing remorse and apology through the individual badness
model, judges and scholars have been too slow to see how the social value
of remorse and apology can further the criminal law’s core aims.
3. Lessons from Noncriminal Contexts: Civil Mediation
Unlike the criminal law, other areas of law have begun to use remorse
and apology in reconciliation rituals. The state’s interests are stronger in the
155. TAVUCHIS, supra note 12, at 35; see Pavlick, supra note 120, at 851-53 (outlining
potential psychological barriers to apology).
156. See, e.g., Taft, supra note 14, at 1142 (noting that apologies can be “difficult, pain-filled,
and potentially humiliating”); Levi, supra note 146, at 1181 (observing that apologies can be
“acutely susceptible to miscalculation, impasse, uncertainty, and failure to achieve desired ends”);
supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting psychological barriers that can obstruct remorse and
apology); cf. WILLIAM IAN MILLER, FAKING IT 77-90 (2003) (arguing that “faking it” is a
ritualized and almost integral part of any real apology).
157. See, e.g., Shuman, supra note 145, at 184 (“Not all victims find apologies soothing and
apologies do not respond to all wrongs.”); Interview with Paul Engelmayer, Assistant U.S.
Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the SDNY, 1989-1994 and 1996-1999, in New York, N.Y.
(Mar. 26, 2004) (observing that in cases of financial crimes involving only monetary harm to
victims, victims generally “wanted their money back and the defendants in jail and out of their
lives”). But see supra notes 144-146 and infra note 298 (citing studies concluding that victims in
general view the possibility of emotional reconciliation and healing after a crime as very
important).
158. See Robinson, supra note 72, at 381 (observing that few people would think that “justice
was done” if “a serious wrongdoer [were] free to skip away to a happy life, even if he genuinely
apologized to [his victim]”); infra notes 181-183 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Shuman, supra note 145, at 185 (noting that sexual assault victims who did not
receive an apology “were seriously disappointed”); Taft, supra note 14, at 1141 (stating that a
botched apology “can strain relationships or fuel bitter vengeance”).
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criminal than in the civil context, of course, which explains why remorse
and apology should not substitute for punishment. But the criminal law
could do both, satisfying the state’s interest in punishment as well as
learning from civil mediation how to serve offenders’ and victims’
interests. Civil mediation scholarship emphasizes that expressions of
remorse and apology can be valuable ways to resolve disputes.160 Scholars
and commentators in this area stress the need for corresponding legal
reforms to facilitate the social and relational benefits of remorse and
apology. For example, the rules of evidence may need to exclude some
apology-related statements from evidence, and legal education should train
law students and lawyers in successful mediation.161
Empirical findings support the usefulness of this approach. Victims
frequently value genuine expressions of sorrow and contrition more than
monetary compensation,162 and will often forgo money in the face of such
expressions. For example, in one study published in the Journal of the
American Medical Association, nearly one-fourth of families who sued their
physicians following prenatal injuries reported doing so primarily because
their physicians “had failed to be completely honest with them about what
happened.”163 Similarly, in the sexual assault context, researchers have
found that “[m]ost [civil] claimants . . . were interested in pursuing their
claim for therapeutic rather than financial reasons. They identified the
desire to be heard, have their experience validated, and receive an apology
as important aspects of their therapeutic expectations for the legal

160. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION AND OTHER PROCESSES 159-60 (3d ed. 1999) (stating that “[t]he first lesson of
dispute resolution that many of us learn as children is the importance of apologizing” and going
on to explain that an “apology is valuable in repairing whatever harm to the relationship has
resulted from the dispute” and that “[m]any mediators have had one or more experiences . . . in
which an apology was the key to a settlement that might otherwise not have been attainable”);
Pavlick, supra note 120; Levi, supra note 146.
161. See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SCANLON, MEDIATOR’S DESKBOOK 68 (1999) (raising “the
possibility of an apology as a component of resolving the dispute” in the checklist of mediator’s
techniques); O’Hara & Yarn, supra note 131, at 1169-83 (arguing for evidentiary reforms to better
realize the value of apology in litigation); Marshall H. Tanick & Teresa J. Ayling, Alternative
Dispute Resolution by Apology: Settlement by Saying “I’m Sorry,” HENNEPIN LAW., July-Aug.
1996, at 22, 22 (arguing for proactive use of apology in mediation); see also Cohen, supra note
138, at 1032-36, 1061-63. In light of these developments, several states have amended their
evidentiary rules to provide safe harbors for apology. See Aviva Orenstein, Apology Excepted:
Incorporating a Feminist Analysis into Evidence Policy Where You Would Least Expect It, 28 SW.
U. L. REV. 221, 247-48 (1999); Latif, supra note 152, at 301.
162. See supra notes 144-146.
163. Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors That Prompted Families To File Medical Malpractice
Claims Following Prenatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1361 (1992), cited in Jonathan R. Cohen,
Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1447, 1458 (2000).
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process.”164 And in the defamation context, many plaintiffs care more about
apologies than money. This is partly because retractions counteract
reputational harm, but also partly because refusals to apologize antagonize
victims. Many pursue litigation only after publishers rebuff their requests
for retractions and apologies.165
Developments in mediation practice reflect the trend toward apology.
Remorse and apology are increasingly seen as central elements in
successful mediation.166 The sessions focus “on the parties’ interests rather
than on their legal position or rights. Parties have the opportunity to tell
their story, to explain their needs, and to vent their feelings.”167 This
discourse is designed to foster discussion of moral and interpersonal
obligations as well as legal ones.168 As Donna Pavlick explains, mediation
is “an opportunity to connect face-to-face and engage in interactive
negotiation that is beyond purely adversarial behavior.”169 Mediation thus
lets parties “confront the substantive . . . values at the core of their
relationship” and provides an “opportunity for the [offender] to apologize
and for the victim to forgive.”170 In other words, mediation encourages the
parties to express themselves emotionally and morally. This
encouragement, glaringly absent from adversarial litigation, is intensely
important in overcoming psychological barriers, allowing defendants to

164. Shuman, supra note 145, at 185 (citing Nathalie Des Rosiers et al., Legal Compensation
for Sexual Violence: Therapeutic Consequences and Consequences for the Judicial System, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 433 (1998)).
165. RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY 7994, 159-68, 172, 228-33 (1987) (finding that many plaintiffs would initially be content with
apologies but that, after defendants rebuff their requests, many shift to litigation to vindicate and
punish); see also id. at 159-68, 172, 228-33 (finding that plaintiffs would consider forgoing
litigation if a mediation alternative were open to them but that they sue because they lack
alternative avenues of redress); id. at 232 (suggesting that defense lawyers might not naturally
support mediation because it cuts against their financial interest).
166. See O’Hara & Yarn, supra note 131, at 1126 (“Failure to take into account these human
tastes for apology and forgiveness can have significant consequences, . . . [which] have
historically garnered little attention from our formal legal system. Recently, proponents of
apology and forgiveness, particularly from the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement,
have urged increased sensitivity to the uses and nuances of these behaviors and their effect on the
resolution of disputes.”).
167. Pavlick, supra note 120, at 857.
168. Levi, supra note 146, at 1171 (citing Craig A. McEwan & Richard J. Maiman,
Mediation in Small Claims Court: Consensual Processes and Outcomes, in MEDIATION
RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION 53, 60 (Kenneth
Kressel et al. eds., 1989)).
169. Pavlick, supra note 120, at 857. Pavlick goes on to note that “[t]he parties often can
settle their differences and effectively resolve the dispute. They can restore the moral balance of
power.” Id. at 857-58.
170. Id.

FLIPPED_BIBAS.DOC

2004]

9/28/2004 9:50 PM

Integrating Remorse and Apology

121

acknowledge legal and moral responsibility, and providing victims with
needed moral recompense.171
The contrast between civil mediation and criminal litigation could not
be more stark. Clearly, these two fields differ significantly, and the parallels
are not perfect. Nonetheless, civil mediation’s current direction is very
different from criminal justice’s emphasis on offenders as individuals and
its focus on procedural values to the exclusion of substantive concerns.
Because routine civil cases are much less about individual blame,
retribution, and procedural rights, civil law has found it easier to mine the
substantive social value of remorse and apology.172
C. The Practical Import of the Relational Perspective
Different readers might implement the preceding theoretical discussion
in different ways. Most restorative justice enthusiasts, such as Braithwaite,
treat remorse and apology as wholesale substitutes for the allegedly cruel,
backward instrument of punishment.173 In Braithwaite’s view, “Restorative
justice is most commonly defined by what it is an alternative to,” namely
the punishment-centered “justice model.”174 According to this view,
171. See, e.g., DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR
LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS § 7.1, at 188 (1996); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 160, at 159-62;
Levi, supra note 146, at 1171; see also JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 220-35 (1989) (discussing the importance of psychological
and interpersonal variables to successful dispute resolution).
172. This parallel is evident in the reparations context as well, where victims of historical
injustices have no clear legal claims against wrongdoers. There, both theoretical and
overwhelming practical problems limit reliance on deterrence, retributivism, and individual rights.
Apologies thus become an “important form of in-kind reparation” because they “transfer to
recipients a valuable intangible benefit, that of moral acknowledgment of historical injustice.”
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 689, 729-30 (2003). They also simultaneously help “to remove the stain of moral
taint” from the apologizer—often a high-level official speaking on behalf of a country or its
institutions—by acknowledging the failure of the apologizer’s institutions to prevent the injustice.
Id. at 709, 709-10. Expressions of remorse, contrition, and apology are likewise central to truth
and reconciliation commissions because of similar practical and theoretical problems with
inflicting retribution, deterring, and serving individual rights. See, e.g., Brandon Hamber, Rights
and Reasons: Challenges for Truth Recovery in South Africa and Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 1074, 1083 (2003) (noting importance of expressions of remorse and apology to
addressing consequences of victimhood and promoting truth and reconciliation through the use of
formal commissions); Dan Markel, The Justice of Amnesty? Towards a Theory of Retributivism in
Recovering States, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 389, 394-98 (1999) (discussing pragmatic and political
problems in the use of criminal prosecutions for violations of human rights committed during
apartheid in South Africa); Okechukwu Oko, Confronting Transgressions of Prior Military
Regimes: Towards a More Pragmatic Approach, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89, 139
(2003) (discussing the importance of expressions of remorse and “genuine contrition on the part
of perpetrators” to achieving “‘reconciliation and forgiveness as a basis for peace and unity’” in
Nigeria through a proposed truth commission (quoting President Obasanjo of Nigeria)).
173. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
174. Braithwaite, supra note 70, at 4.
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“retribution is in the same category as greed or gluttony,” a vice that is
“corrosive of human health and relationships.”175 Many proponents view
restorative justice as inconsistent with the criminal justice system’s
assignment of blame because they fear that blame hinders acceptance of
responsibility and healing.176 Thus, they stress that laypeople should run
restorative justice procedures as an alternative to the cold, professionalized,
punitive machinery of the criminal justice system.177 At most, they argue,
criminal punishment should be a fallback for those offenders who refuse to
apologize or make restitution.178
Many restorative justice programs function in just this way, either by
displacing adjudication entirely or by substituting for the tail end of
criminal procedure. Vermont, for example, reserves traditional criminal
punishment for violent offenders and other felons who are likely to
recidivate. A reparative track handles mild to moderately serious crimes,
such as burglary, attempted grand larceny, drunk driving, fraud, theft,
underage drinking, simple assault, and drug possession. These offenders are
adjudicated guilty in the traditional justice system but are not punished.
Instead, they enter a reparative program that requires them to make amends,
take classes, and write essays on the importance of the law and their
crimes.179 Salt Lake City diverts misdemeanants with no history of violence
to restorative justice programs. If offenders attend classes, pay restitution of
no more than $180, and listen to victims of other crimes talk about their
experiences, prosecutors dismiss their cases.180
We do not embrace this dichotomy between apology and punishment
because it guts the solemn force of the criminal sanction. At least where the
offender has significantly wronged an identifiable victim, excusing him
175. Id. at 7; see also Susan M. Olson & Albert W. Dzur, Reconstructing Professional Roles
in Restorative Justice Programs, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 57, 77 (“‘Retributive,’ ‘punitive,’ and
‘offender-based’ perspectives are seen as in tension with the value of restoration, and it is the job
of the restorative justice professional to correct or modify these perspectives . . . .”).
176. See Olson & Dzur, supra note 175, at 72 (“Another widely but not universally
acknowledged distinction is that restorative justice does not apply to the blame-fixing stage of the
criminal justice process.” (citing JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE
REGULATION 35-36 (2002))).
177. Id. at 64 (“Restorative justice theory at times seems to imply little need for professionals
at all.”); id. at 87, 87-88 (noting that “the idea of de-professionalizing . . . is such a strong element
of restorative justice theory,” even though in practice program administrators tend to become
more professional); cf. id. at 76 (“A core value of the traditional criminal justice system that has
less resonance in restorative justice is protecting the rights of offenders.”).
178. See Braithwaite, Holism, supra note 72, at 404 (“[A]tonement has more power in
affirming a just moral order than punishment. But when criminals eschew atonement,
punishment—or at least some solemn public condemnation of the crime—is needed to affirm that
moral order and to vindicate victims.”); see also Olson & Dzur, supra note 175, at 76 (“If
offenders utterly fail to comply with [Salt Lake City’s restorative justice program requirements],
they are referred back to the court for entry of the conviction and normal sentencing.”).
179. Olson & Dzur, supra note 175, at 65-68 & n.30.
180. Id. at 68-71.
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from punishment belittles the crime and the harm. Offenders, victims, and
society interpret the failure to punish to mean that the crime is not really
wrong and that the offender is free to keep doing it.181 As Judge Morris
Hoffman fears, restorative justice without punishment becomes “a de facto
decriminalization of certain minor offenses which the mavens of the
movement do not think should be punished, but which our Puritan ethos
commands cannot be ignored.”182 Restorative justice requires no amends to
right the imbalanced scales of justice and no bite to underscore society’s
condemnation of the crime. As Garvey cogently puts it,
Missing from the restorativist agenda . . . is the idea of punishment
as moral condemnation. . . .
. . . Restorativism cannot achieve the victim’s restoration if it
refuses to vindicate the victim’s worth through punishment. Nor
can it restore the offender, who can only atone for his wrong if he
willingly submits to punishment. And if neither the victim nor the
wrongdoer is restored, then neither is the community of which they
are a part.183
While most restorative justice programs supplant punishment for some
categories of cases, a few have begun to blend mediation and punishment.
For example, the University of Wisconsin Law School has begun a
restorative justice project that arranges mediation in prison between
offenders and victims or their relatives.184 During one mediation session, an
attempted murderer accepted responsibility, broke down in tears, and
hugged his victim, who in turn forgave him.185 In another, the mother of a
rape and stabbing victim asked to meet with the rapist, who had steadfastly

181. Cf. DUFF, supra note 66, at 143-55 (discussing the communicative dimensions of
different types of sanctions); MORRIS, supra note 63, at 104 (“Central to punishment of others . . .
is a communicative act. . . . Punishment is deprivatory conduct that means something.”); Kahan,
supra note 9, at 619-24 (noting that citizens view fines as inadequate punishment for serious
offenses because they fail to express condemnation and allow an offender to “buy his way out,”
pay the fine, and continue to commit crime (internal quotation marks omitted)).
182. Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial
Collectivism: The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
2063, 2067 (2002).
183. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, supra note 9, at 1844. As discussed earlier, a few
supporters of restorative justice have admitted that punishment might occasionally be necessary
for serious crimes or unrepentant offenders. See, e.g., Zehr, supra note 72. Even this concession,
however, is not enough. It does not recognize that for most crimes of more than minimal
seriousness, punishment is needed to underscore the community’s denunciation of the crime and
vindication of the victim.
184. See Frank J. Remington Ctr., Restorative Justice Project, http://www.law.wisc.edu/
fjr/restorative/rjpvoc.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2004).
185. Tag Evers, Blessed Are the Peace Makers, ISTHMUS (Madison, Wis.), Apr. 10-16, 1998,
at 9.
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claimed innocence during and after his trial. In the prison-based mediation,
he broke down and admitted guilt.186 Likewise, the Iowa and Minnesota
Departments of Corrections have begun prison-based victim-offender
mediation, circles of support and accountability, family team meetings, and
victim-impact classes for incarcerated offenders.187 Victims can ask
offenders why the crime happened, give voice to their wounds, and heal.188
To our knowledge, however, this intriguing fusion of mediation and
punishment has gone largely unnoticed by the academic literature.189
Other scholars, such as Kahan, emphasize using apology as a costeffective shaming sanction.190 These scholars say little about the interactive,
face-to-face processes of voluntary remorse and apology and the
accompanying healing and reconciliation. Instead, their idea is to “magnify
the humiliation inherent in conviction” by “communicating the offender’s
status to a wider audience,” “publicly disgrac[ing] the offender,”
“requir[ing] offenders to publicize their own convictions,” or ordering
offenders to make public or in-person apologies.191 Expressively satisfying
shaming sanctions such as public humiliation, denunciation rituals, and
forced apologies can deter offenders and denounce crime more cheaply than
prison.192 Many commentators have pointed out the cruelty of this approach
to shaming, and we will not rehash those arguments here.193 Our objection
186. Id.
187. Telephone Interview with Bruce Kittle, member of the board of directors of the VictimOffender Mediation Ass’n and chaplain, Iowa Dep’t of Corr. Servs. (Feb. 27, 2004); Minn. Dep’t
of Corr., Sample Restorative Justice Practices in Minnesota, http://www.doc.state.mn.us/
aboutdoc/restorativejustice/rjsamples.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2004).
188. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., History of Victim and Restorative Justice Programs,
http://www.doc.state.ia.us/VictimHistory.asp (last visited Sept. 4, 2004).
189. Duff is the one significant exception. He does not examine the features of these
programs in great detail, but he does try to integrate the idea of criminal mediation into a
normative justification for punishment. See DUFF, supra note 66, at 88-106 (arguing for the
increased use of mediation, probation, and community service orders as central to his theory of
punishment as a communicative enterprise).
190. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
191. Kahan, supra note 9, at 631-34; see also Kahan & Posner, supra note 45, at 368
(“Shaming is the process by which citizens publicly and self-consciously draw attention to the bad
dispositions or actions of an offender, as a way of punishing him for having those dispositions or
engaging in those actions.”).
192. See Kahan & Posner, supra note 45, at 368 (arguing that “shaming penalties could prove
to be an efficient alternative to prison for white-collar offenders” because they “create strong
economic and psychological disincentives against crime, and at only a small fraction of the cost of
incarceration”); Skeel, supra note 67, at 1814-15 (arguing that the “moral disapproval” expressed
by the “enforcer” through shaming sanctions can “have a chastening effect on actual offenders”
and “can also discourage potential offenders from misbehaving in the first instance”).
193. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 82-83 (1993) (criticizing
shaming penalties as “demeaning rituals” and “attempts to humiliate” that disrespect offenders’
human dignity); Garvey, Shaming Punishments, supra note 9, at 759 (noting that “some
contemporary shaming penalties do cross—or come close to crossing—the line” of humiliation
and dehumanization); Massaro, supra note 68, at 1943 (criticizing shaming punishments in part
because they are efforts to “search for and destroy or damage an offender’s dignity”). But cf.
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is a different one: By viewing apology as simply a means of humiliation,
Kahan and others slight its positive role.194 Apology and remorse may be
painful, but the main reason for using them is not to inflict pain or satisfy
the community’s bloodlust. Nor should they serve to ostracize offenders; on
the contrary, they are tools for drawing offenders back toward the fold. In
Braithwaite’s terminology, remorse and apology should be reintegrative
shaming sanctions rather than disintegrative ones.195 They can heal and
strengthen wounded relationships. Remorse and apology are valuable not
because pain is good per se, but because they underscore communal norms,
reaffirm offenders’ moral personalities, and heal victims, offenders, and
their communities.
In short, remorse and apology are neither substitutes for punishment nor
cruel, ostracizing forms of punishment. Instead, remorse and apology
should supplement but not supplant punishment. The values served by
remorse and apology should be more integral parts of the process of
prosecution and punishment. For the criminal law to regulate society
effectively and morally educate, it must serve the values of remorse and
apology in addition to deterring crimes, inflicting retribution, and protecting
defendants’ rights.196 Our proposal synthesizes the strengths of restorative
justice and Kahan’s shaming approach while avoiding their weaknesses.
Restorativists demonstrate how remorse and apology can reconcile and
heal, while shaming advocates show how remorse and apology can express
condemnation of crime and reinforce norms. Each extreme overemphasizes
one important piece of the puzzle at the expense of the other.
Currently, however, our criminal justice system is largely a punishment
assembly line dominated by prosecutors and defense counsel, in which

James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1059
(1998) (rejecting shaming sanctions not because they are cruel to the offender but because “[t]hey
represent an unacceptable style of governance through their play on public psychology”).
194. As Kahan explains, the contrition and apology penalties touted by shaming scholars
often “combine stigmatizing publicity with an element of [forced] self-debasement.” Kahan, supra
note 9, at 634. While in some cases the penalties “contemplate genuine rapprochement,” in most
cases they do not, and “the sincerity of the offenders’ remorse seems largely irrelevant.” Id.
195. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 54-97 (1989); Michael
Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in America, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1751, 1763-71
(1999) (criticizing Kahan’s embrace of disintegrative shaming punishments). But cf. Dan M.
Kahan, Unspeakable Misrepresentations: A Response to Tonry, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1933, 1934-35
(1999) (insisting that his aim is not to sate the public’s desires for debasement and degradation
and that in fact shaming penalties are less degrading than imprisonment).
196. The two scholars whose approaches come close to ours are Stephen Garvey and R.A.
Duff. Garvey, however, focuses on building a theoretical model of punishment that includes some
of these concepts. He does not really discuss how to import these ideas into actual criminal
procedure and the disposition of cases. See Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, supra note 9, at
1810-29. Similarly, Duff largely restricts his discussion of remorse and apology to their
communicative functions in the mediation context as part of his overall theoretical project of
justifying punishment as purposive communication. See DUFF, supra note 66, at 79-125.
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other actors unfortunately fade into the background. How should remorse
and apology change the roles of offenders, victims, and society?
For offenders, we need to move beyond the individual badness model.
Remorse and apology should be about much more than simply how much
deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution an offender needs. Rather, they
are important ways to promote education, expiation, and restoration. Until
offenders express remorse or apologize, they often hide behind self-serving
denials and distortions. Denial impedes treatment and moral reform, as
offenders refuse to admit that they need to change their behavior. It also
keeps offenders from acknowledging their moral agency and acting as
responsible, law-abiding citizens. Denial and resistance to treatment can
thus greatly increase the risk of recidivism.197
At the same time, we must not view remorse and apology as helping
victims at the expense of offenders. This zero-sum adversarial mentality
overlooks how remorse and apology can benefit offenders as well as
victims. Offenders who come to terms with their crimes and apologize start
on the path to reform. They learn valuable lessons and feel better about
themselves as persons. They may thus become less likely to recidivate and
are prime candidates for mercy to temper criminal justice.198
Victims also need to play a larger role. The relational process of
apology gives them much-needed opportunities to achieve catharsis and to
learn that the crime was not personal or their fault.199 The process needs to
allow plenty of points at which victims can participate and benefit from
expressions of remorse and apology. Many victims will understandably be
reluctant to go through the process for fear of reliving traumatic moments
and seeing the offenders again. The criminal justice system should not force
victims or offenders to take part, but it should persistently but gently
encourage them to do so. For example, mediation programs let victims and
offenders bring friends, relatives, victim advocates, or clergy to the
mediation. These third parties can allay victims’ fears and encourage
offenders to make amends.200 Mediators reinforce victims’ sense of safety
and empowerment by soliciting their input on the location, scheduling,

197. See Bibas, supra note 10, at 1395-96.
198. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
199. See FLETCHER, supra note 58, at 248 (endorsing a German proposal to have victims
approve all plea bargains, which would require facilitating understanding between victims and
offenders, would empower victims, and so might lessen the need for additional victim vindication
at a public trial).
200. MARK S. UMBREIT, THE HANDBOOK OF VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION 21, 23, 29, 32
(2001); Gordon Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, A Comparison of Four Restorative Justice
Conferencing Models, JUV. JUST. BULL., Feb. 2001, at 1, 6-7.
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layout, and conduct of the mediation.201 Apology procedures such as these
can help to empower victims and supplement restitution, though they do not
supplant it.
Society has a role to play as well. Offenders have wronged society, not
just identifiable victims, by disregarding its norms and sowing fear and
disorder. Remorse and apology help to affirm communal norms and restore
the moral balance. Our criminal justice system should recognize the
community’s legitimate stake in the process, even if in some cases its role is
largely symbolic. Though the primary recipients of apologies and restitution
must be victims, the processes of remorse and apology should take place
with the encouragement and blessing of the community.202 Juries and
judges, as voices of the community, should more clearly articulate these
functions.203
In sum, prosecutors and defense counsel currently dominate criminal
procedure and leave little room for remorse or apology. To take these
practices seriously, criminal procedure must acknowledge the social,
relational dimension of crime and give greater roles to other important
actors. It should encourage offenders, victims, and society’s representatives
to work through the process of apology and reconciliation. The next Part
discusses concrete procedural changes that might better achieve these goals.
III. IMPLEMENTING REMORSE AND APOLOGY
While some academics have theorized about the benefits of remorse
and apology, few have tried to translate theory into practice. At most,
scholars and practitioners generally assume that the natural place for
remorse and apology is at sentencing. This assumption goes hand in
hand with the assumption that remorse and apology are really about the
amount of punishment that the individual offender needs. This cramped

201. UMBREIT, supra note 200, at 21-25. Mediators should also support victims and
offenders by using sensitive language, not pushing too hard, and ensuring that the parties
participate voluntarily. Id. at 22-27.
202. See Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 200, at 6-7 (discussing how sentencing circles
empower community representatives by giving them a voice in choosing appropriate sentences);
see also id. at 8 (noting that while victim-offender mediation limits the relevant community to
these two participants, sentencing circles include as part of the community “anyone with a stake in
the resolution of a crime who chooses to participate in the circle”). But see Robert Weisberg,
Restorative Justice and the Danger of “Community,” 2003 UTAH L. REV. 343, 358-59 (criticizing
the “contrived nature of the community setting” as an artifact created by proponents of restorative
justice).
203. See Linda Ross Meyer, Forgiveness and Public Trust, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1515,
1532 (2000) (noting that the jury should serve as the “voice of the community, setting the terms of
reintegration” of offenders back into the group); Katie Long, Note, Community Input at
Sentencing: Victim’s Right or Victim’s Revenge?, 75 B.U. L. REV. 187, 227 (1995) (advocating
the use of local judges and juries to increase community input through these actors).
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approach ignores the potential for fostering reconciliation throughout the
criminal process.
This Part explores how concrete procedures can foster the benefits of
remorse and apology at every stage. Section A discusses the early stages of
the criminal process, from before arrest to shortly after charging. Section B
considers how victim-offender mediation and similar forms of alternative
dispute resolution might work for certain types of crimes. These
procedures, we argue, can supplement the criminal process and may
occasionally supplant it for certain less serious crimes. Section C addresses
the role of cooperating witnesses and the ways that prosecutors can
encourage remorse and apology. Section D explores the role of victims’
rights throughout the criminal process, including long before sentencing.
Section E proposes reforms to plea procedures. Section F suggests
reforming sentencing to make it about more than just the individual
offender’s badness. Finally, Section G considers the costs, difficulties, and
tradeoffs that our proposals may involve.
A. At the Beginning of the Criminal Process
Though the public may think of arrest and charging as automatic
events, these decisions involve substantial discretion. Police have wide
latitude in deciding whether to arrest an individual and file charges.
Likewise, prosecutors can choose whether to accept police officers’
recommendations and pursue those charges. Particularly for lower-level
crimes, police may not arrest and prosecutors may decline to charge or may
divert cases for alternative resolution after charging.204
Remorse and apology could play a much larger role in these decisions.
Moving in this direction would not require changing existing law; police
and prosecutors would simply have to use their existing discretion with an
eye toward encouraging remorse and apology. While some probably use
their discretion in this way already, there is room to do more. Of course, a
simple apology is no substitute for arrest and prosecution of a crime of
violence. But the bulk of crimes are relatively minor, including petty thefts
and vandalism.205 In these cases, informal resolution may resolve cases

204. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-130 (2003) (authorizing deferred prosecution
before or after the filing of charges, with possible dismissal of charges, except for driving while
impaired); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.411 (2004) (authorizing prosecutors to decline to prosecute
for a variety of reasons, including a request of the victim, particularly for minor assaults and
nonviolent property crimes that result in no major loss).
205. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 203301, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2002, at 188 tbl.3.1 (2002), available at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/ (reporting that in 2001, there were more than three times as
many property crimes as crimes against the person and that 77% of these property crimes were
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better than arrest and prosecution. By forgoing arrest or delaying it pending
restitution and amends, the system can promote face-to-face interaction
between offenders and victims.206 In appropriate cases, the result may be
apology and reconciliation. Offenders may better appreciate the
wrongfulness of their acts, while victims may find the swift apology
satisfying. And by bringing in parents or other authority figures, the law can
reinforce the moral authority of its pronouncements and the need for
remorse, reform, and apology.207
Even after arrest, prosecutors may decline to prosecute if a low-level
offender expresses remorse and makes restitution or amends. Prosecutors
can use the threat of charges as leverage by deferring prosecution or
diverting cases to alternative forums, ultimately dismissing the charges if
offenders apologize and make amends. Pretrial diversion programs, of
course, are already well established in many jurisdictions.208 Expressions of
apology and contrition, moreover, often play significant roles in individual
prosecutors’ decisions to make these alternative dispositions available to
offenders.209 But prosecutors still use such programs sporadically and
thefts or attempted thefts, of which 67% involved completed thefts of less than $250); id. at 451
tbl.4.6 (reporting 8933 murders and nonnegligent manslaughters, 17,394 forcible rapes, and
69,405 robberies in 2002, compared with 729,825 larcenies, 362,979 cases of drunkenness,
398,728 cases of disorderly conduct, 169,842 cases of vandalism, and 51,275 cases of prostitution
and commercialized vice).
206. Requiring restitution and amends may promote the face-to-face interaction that leads to
apology, though restitution is no substitute for apology. Deborah Levi relates the following
example of one such use of remorse and apology:
[I]n one case of neighborhood vandalism, nine families became involved in restoring
damage done to the victim’s home. Each child involved apologized to the homeowner
and explained the details of the damage he had caused. Then each child paid twentyeight dollars that he, not his parents, earned in order to pay for repairs. Lastly, each
child promised not to retaliate against the homeowner’s son.
. . . The payments reimbursed the victim for the damage . . . ; the promises
restored the homeowner’s sense of security in the neighborhood; and the apology
vindicated the homeowner’s sense of moral indignation while his forgiveness
reconciled the neighbors.
Levi, supra note 146, at 1202 (footnote omitted).
207. See Luna, supra note 71, at 300 (“[T]he presence of the young person’s family, their
personal condemnation of the offense, and the visible signs of anguish felt by family members
confronted by the harm caused by their own kin all provide exceptionally powerful signals to the
juvenile on the wrongfulness of his conduct.”).
208. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.40 (McKinney 2004) (providing for the
dismissal of a prosecutor’s information or a misdemeanor complaint in the interests of justice); id.
§ 170.55 (providing for the adjournment of criminal charges in contemplation of dismissal);
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-22.000 (1997) (providing for the
possibility of pretrial diversion for certain crimes).
209. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.40(1)(d) (McKinney 2004) (directing the court
to consider, among other things, “the history, character and condition of the defendant” in ruling
on a motion to dismiss in the interests of justice); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 208, § 9-22.100
(leaving solely to the discretion of the U.S. Attorney the decision whether to “divert any
individual against whom a prosecutable case exists,” so long as the individual is not charged with
certain specified offenses); Interview with Paul Engelmayer, supra note 157 (characterizing
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inconsistently, with great variation among jurisdictions.210 This is
particularly true when it comes to institutionalizing prosecutorial efforts to
facilitate direct, interactive expressions of remorse and apology through
diversion. Unlike traditional restorative justice enthusiasts,211 we do not see
remorse and apology as wholesale substitutes for criminal punishment. But
in appropriate minor cases, expressions of remorse, apology, and perhaps
promises of restitution may suffice.
The biggest objection to this proposal is that discretion allows police
and prosecutors to discriminate, consciously or unconsciously, based on
race and other characteristics. This risk of discrimination is especially
troubling because race, sex, and class may color assessments of remorse
and apology.212 While this risk of discrimination is real and pervasive, it is
already inherent in existing prosecutorial and police discretion. Indeed, a
deliberate focus on remorse and apology might help to structure this
discretion, making it less susceptible to arbitrariness and discrimination.
Prosecutors might promulgate written policies that spell out criteria for
declining or diverting minor cases in which offenders apologize and begin
to make amends. No law can eradicate all danger of discrimination, but
policies that are sensitive to this danger can reduce its risk.
B. Victim-Offender Mediation and Similar Mechanisms
In the last few decades, communities have experimented with various
voluntary, nonadversarial processes for bringing offenders, crime victims,
and others together. Victim-offender mediation brings offenders (especially
juveniles) and victims face to face.213 Community reparative boards allow
panels of trained citizens to discuss crimes with offenders and agree on
restitution plans.214 Family group conferences bring together the families of
“admission of wrongdoing and remorse” as “conditions” to the use of diversionary programs);
Interview with Peter Vigeland, Assistant Dist. Attorney, Manhattan Dist. Attorney’s Office, 19801984, in New York, N.Y. (Mar. 26, 2004) (noting that “expressions of contrition certainly helped”
in local prosecutors’ eyes when considering whether to move for an adjournment in contemplation
of dismissal under section 170.40 of New York’s Criminal Procedure Law).
210. See, e.g., Thomas E. Ulrich, Pretrial Diversion in the Federal Court System, FED.
PROBATION, Dec. 2002, at 30, 34 (noting that while a handful of federal districts diverted 30% or
more of their total pretrial supervision caseloads between 1995 and 1999, there was wide variation
and other districts diverted only 2% of their pretrial supervision cases). We recognize that the
more leverage the system employs to press for remorse and apology, the greater the danger that
these expressions will be insincere. We discuss this issue infra Section III.F. We also recognize
that any benefits tied to making amends must take into account the offender’s means. In other
words, a poor offender who credibly commits to make restitution should not suffer simply because
he lacks the wealth to pay restitution immediately.
211. See supra notes 173-183 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
213. Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 200, at 2.
214. Id. at 3.
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offenders and victims to discuss crimes, mediated by a trained facilitator.215
Sentencing circles allow victims, offenders, the friends and family of both,
community members, and justice professionals to deliberate and agree upon
a sentence.216 While these four models differ slightly, each lets victims
explain how crimes affected them, ask questions, develop restitution plans,
seek apologies, and air their sorrows. In turn, offenders learn about their
victims’ sufferings; ideally, apologize and commit to making amends; and
heal the guilt that might otherwise plague their conscience.217 Many
programs also incorporate victims’ and offenders’ family and friends, to
provide support, encouragement, and oversight as offenders commit to
change. Victims can more easily express their pain and anger with loved
ones at their sides. Offenders are skilled at denying or minimizing their
crimes, but the tears of their parents or siblings can pierce these denials and
drive home the need for change.218
These nascent mechanisms can be quite successful. A meta-analysis of
empirical studies found that victim-offender mediation and family
conferencing (hereinafter “mediation”) was consistently more successful
than traditional criminal justice in a variety of ways: 82% of victims whose
cases were handled in mediation believed that the criminal justice system
was fair, versus 56% of those in court.219 Likewise, 91% of offenders whose
cases were handled in mediation thought the criminal justice system was
fair, versus 78% of those in court.220 The same meta-analysis found that
78% of victims in mediation were satisfied with the handling of their cases,

215. Id. at 5.
216. Id. at 6.
217. Duff explains the basic criminal mediation process this way:
Part of the point of the criminal mediation process consists . . . in th[e] exchange of
explanations. The victim can explain her suffering to the offender . . . in [a way] that
expresses and tries to communicate . . . her hurt and anger, and that condemns the crime
as a wrong. She will also have a chance to come to understand (which will not be to
condone) the offender’s action from his perspective. The offender will be vividly
confronted, through his victim’s voice, with his crime. But he will also have a chance to
explain himself.
DUFF, supra note 66, at 93.
218. See Braithwaite, supra note 70, at 47-49 (noting that offenders frequently deny that there
was a victim, that the victim suffered injury, that they were responsible for their actions, that their
actions were blameworthy, or that the victim was in the right, and noting that, while offenders
may deflect shame from themselves, seeing the shame of their loved ones at their deeds may spur
them to discuss their responsibility or change their ways).
219. Poulson, supra note 139, at 179-80 tbl.1 & fig.1 (relying on four studies of victims).
One potential confounding factor in all of these studies is that all parties must consent to
mediation. The cases of those victims or offenders who decline mediation and choose to go to
court may differ systematically from the cases that enter mediation; for example, the mediation
participants may be more optimistic and less bitter. Thus, the sample of cases in which all parties
consent to mediate may be skewed towards those who are already receptive to it and its benefits.
220. Id. (relying on five studies of offenders).
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versus 56% of victims in traditional court proceedings.221 Likewise, 84% of
offenders in mediation were satisfied with the handling of their cases,
versus 73% of offenders in court.222 Those in mediation are more likely to
have a chance to tell their stories (94% versus 64% of victims, and 88%
versus 64% of offenders).223 They are also more likely to feel that their
opinions were adequately considered (94% versus 92% of victims, and 72%
versus 55% of offenders).224 They are more likely to feel that the judge or
mediator was fair in their particular case (88% versus 76% of victims, and
91% versus 63% of offenders).225 Those in mediation are more likely to feel
that the outcome was fair and satisfactory (73% versus 54% of victims, and
77% versus 67% of offenders).226 They are also more likely to believe that
the offender was held accountable (92% versus 71% of victims, and 82%
versus 49% of offenders).227 In mediation, offenders are more likely to
apologize (74% versus 29%), victims are more likely to forgive (43%
versus 22%), and victims are less likely to remain upset (28% versus 57%)
or fear revictimization (15% versus 34%).228
Finally, and most importantly, mediation seems to reduce recidivism. A
meta-analysis of fifteen studies found that juvenile offenders who take part
in mediation recidivate up to 26% less than those who go to court.229 When
juvenile offenders do recidivate after mediation, they commit less severe
offenses than adjudicated juveniles do.230 Another meta-analysis found that
in seven out of seven randomized field trials, restorative justice worked at
least as well as adjudication at preventing recidivism. Two of the seven

221. Id. at 181-82 tbl.2 & fig.2 (relying on six studies of victims).
222. Id. (relying on five studies of offenders).
223. Id. at 183-84 tbl.3 & fig.3 (relying on one study of victims and two studies of offenders).
224. Id. at 185 tbl.4 & fig.4 (relying on one study of victims and one study of offenders).
225. Id. at 186-87 tbl.5 & fig.5 (relying on one study of victims and two studies of offenders).
226. Id. at 193 tbl.9 & fig.9 (relying on one study of victims and offenders).
227. Id. at 188-89 tbl.6 & fig.6 (relying on two studies of victims and two studies of
offenders).
228. Id. at 190-91 tbl.7 & fig.7 (relying, for apology and forgiveness statistics, on one study
of victims and four studies of offenders); id. at 196-98 tbls.11-12 & figs.11-12 (relying, for upsetvictim statistics, on two studies and, for fear-of-revictimization statistics, on four studies); see
Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 29-30 figs.2-3, 40 fig.12 (finding that 72% of victims
received apologies in conferences, compared with 19% of victims in court; that 5% of victims in
conferences feared revictimization by the offender, compared with 18% of those in court; and that
the percentage of victims who feared offenders dropped from 20% before conferences to 9%
afterwards).
229. Victim-offender mediation “participation is associated with a reduction in delinquent
behavior,” particularly if one defines delinquency to mean commission of the same offense again.
William R. Nugent et al., Participation in Victim-Offender Mediation and the Prevalence and
Severity of Subsequent Delinquent Behavior: A Meta-Analysis, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 137, 164. “In
terms of effect size, the reduction in reoffense may be as great as 26% relative to non-VOM
participants.” Id. at 162.
230. Id. at 160-61, 164 (finding that this reduction was large and statistically significant, but
cautioning that few of the studies had addressed the severity of reoffense issue).
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trials found that it clearly reduced recidivism.231 Other studies confirm that
mediation participants are less likely to recidivate and that, when they do
recidivate, they commit less serious offenses.232 One must read the data
cautiously, because many of these studies focused on juveniles and because
some studies found no significant effects. Even so, the results are
promising. On the whole, these programs seem to leave both victims and
offenders more satisfied and better off.
Thus, the law ought to make mediation more widely available. From
arrest to incarceration, both parties should have easy access to and notice of
victim-offender mediation, so they can use it whenever the time is right.233
The court system should supply trained mediators free of charge.
Stenographers would transcribe the mediation so that judges could later use
the transcripts at sentencing.234 The mediation would be at a time and place
most convenient and comfortable to everyone involved. It need not take
place in a courthouse or during business hours, but could be in a school,
church, or home in the evening or on a weekend.235 Offenders would suffer
no penalty for remaining silent or refusing to mediate. They could,
however, choose to show judges at sentencing that they had apologized and
begun to reform.
Each side could engage in as much or as little mediation as it liked. In
some cases, of course, a traumatized victim or stubborn offender would
refuse entirely. Thus, victims of sex crimes or violence might often be
afraid or unwilling to take part. Interestingly, however, mediation seems to
work even better to reduce violent crimes than property crimes.236 Perhaps
the stronger emotions in these cases produce more powerful remorse and
empathy, which in turn may reduce recidivism.237 A mugging victim, for

231. Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 38-39.
232. UMBREIT, supra note 200, at 171-73 (summarizing the results of several English studies
of mediation involving adults, as well as the more numerous mediation programs for youths).
233. Some jurisdictions are already moving in this direction. See supra text accompanying
notes 184-188.
234. One could imagine also making the transcripts available to juries, but this might
encourage self-serving statements or silence in cases that might head to trial. One might also
condition admissibility on the consent of the parties, at least at the guilt stage. Otherwise, defense
lawyers might have to advise their clients to remain silent lest they hurt their cases and prejudice
their Fifth Amendment rights. Unless all parties consented, the transcripts could remain sealed and
confidential. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 408 (making settlement offers and discussions inadmissible “to
prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount,” except when the statement is being
used for another purpose).
235. See Luna, supra note 71, at 299.
236. See Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 40.
237. Id.; see also, e.g., Ralph Blumenthal, Victim’s Son Is Given Award for Forgiving
Father’s Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003, at A26 (reporting that death row inmates banded
together to award a scholarship to a son who forgave his father’s murderer); Cheryl Wetzstein,
Restorative Justice Lets Inmates Make Peace with Victims; Bible-Based Program Wins Converts,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1999, at A2 (noting forceful speeches in favor of restorative justice by the
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example, might be anxious to learn why the mugger targeted her and be
relieved to learn that she was only a random target. But because violent
offenders and victims of violence may be reluctant, mediation may happen
most often for nonviolent property crimes. And as our description implies,
mediation should supplement but not supplant the criminal process.
Mediation should be not a soft escape from or alternative to punishment,
but an adjunct. The outcome of mediation might influence sentencing
judges, as Section F discusses, but it should not preempt sentencing
entirely.
The biggest danger here might be forcing reluctant offenders and
victims into mediation. While most victims like and are satisfied with
mediation, a significant minority (perhaps a quarter to a third) are not.238
The decision to mediate ought to be voluntary; while persuasion and
inducement are appropriate, coercion is not. Officials must judiciously
respect offenders’ and victims’ free choices not to participate, whether out
of self-interest, fear, or anger. Thus, parties should suffer no penalties for
refusing to mediate. There would still be some equality concerns, as when
offenders lose the possible benefits of mediation because victims refuse to
take part, but this risk is a tolerable one.
C. Cooperating Witnesses
Prosecutors frequently convince offenders to flip and become
cooperating witnesses. Cooperators often tape-record conversations,
provide information, and testify against their former co-conspirators and
associates. Frequently, witnesses and lawyers treat cooperation agreements
strictly as business arrangements, in which cooperators help with
investigations and testimony in exchange for reduced sentences or
money.239 This mercenary approach leads to worries about the truthfulness
of cooperators’ testimony; the fear is that they will lie or embellish to
please prosecutors and earn rewards.240
Prosecutors, however, can use their existing discretion differently.
When persuading offenders to cooperate, they can emphasize that offenders

mother of one murder victim and the wife of another murder victim, whose daughter was also
raped).
238. See Braithwaite, supra note 70, at 21-22 (collecting statistics on victim satisfaction of
restorative justice programs).
239. See Simons, supra note 24, at 22-26 (explaining the utilitarian model of cooperation).
240. See, e.g., Symposium, The Cooperating Witness Conundrum: Is Justice Obtainable?, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 747 (2002); Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Defendants: The Costs and
Benefits of Purchasing Information from Scoundrels, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 292 (1996); Ellen
Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and
Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917 (1999).
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have committed shameful deeds and must right their wrongs.241 One
powerful sales pitch is to stress making amends by joining the good guys
with the white hats—“Team America,” as one prominent former federal
prosecutor called it.242 Put another way, prosecutors can do much to
emphasize the moral side of cooperation. Though offenders have acted
badly, many still know at some level that they ought to be ashamed and
recognize a need to atone. The most powerful way to undo a wrong is not
only to renounce it, but to help bring it to justice. Repenting, apologizing,
and making amends are important components of cooperation.243 These
very elements show up in the written cooperation agreements that
prosecutors and cooperators make. Cooperation agreements often require
cooperators to admit guilt, plead guilty (to every crime committed, in some
districts), tell no lies, and make restitution.244
These actions not only help cooperators to expiate their crimes, but also
bring valuable practical benefits. They break down cooperators’ selfidentification with the criminal element and strengthen moral norms. The
moral dimension reinforces the practical rewards for providing candid and
complete information. Crawling out of the web of lies and crime can be
morally satisfying, counteracting to some extent the temptation to concoct
false testimony. The moral transformation may make offenders humbler,
readier to admit their wrongs, and so more credible to juries.245 Thus, their
testimony may be more compelling, adding a practical benefit to the
psychic rewards of morality for its own sake.246
Once again, this use of prosecutorial discretion raises the dangers of
discrimination and abuse of power. But these dangers are inherent in
existing prosecutorial discretion; remorse and apology make them no
worse. On the contrary, by guiding prosecutorial decisions, remorse and
apology may make these decisions more consistent and fair.

241. As Erik Luna puts it, “[G]enuine remorse is a prerequisite to the moral development of
the offender. Without understanding the impropriety of his conduct, he may retain a deviant
identity and connection to an antisocial subculture.” Luna, supra note 71, at 294.
242. Katyal, supra note 41, at 1356 n.186 (quoting Mary Jo White, former U.S. Attorney for
the SDNY).
243. Simons, supra note 24, at 41 (following Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, supra note
9, at 1810-29).
244. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 240, at 953 (reporting that if cooperators lie, they risk
having prosecutors “rip[] up their cooperation agreement[s]” and losing their bargains). The point
in the text also accords with the first author’s experience as a federal prosecutor.
245. One former federal prosecutor explained to one of us in an interview that “obviously
remorseful” cooperators, in his experience, were “much more likely to be effective witnesses”
because their testimony seemed to juries “much less mechanical and less calculated” and they
appeared much more “affected by what they had done.” Interview with Paul Engelmayer, supra
note 157.
246. Simons, supra note 24, at 49-50.
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D. Extending Victims’ Rights
Currently, a criminal case is a duel between the state and the defendant.
Victims are often interviewed and called to testify, and sometimes they
even have a right to make a statement at sentencing. Fundamentally,
however, their role is minor and reactive. Police and prosecutors run the
show; victims lose control when they are victimized and again when their
cases disappear into the criminal justice system. Often, they do not even
learn that an offender has been charged, offered a plea bargain, convicted at
trial, or sentenced, or they learn these things long after the fact.247
There is an extensive literature debating the pros and cons of victims’
rights, and we do not want to wade into that broader debate here. Victims’
bills of rights often guarantee victims fair treatment, protection from the
accused, restitution, notice of court proceedings and outcomes, and
attendance at court proceedings.248 Nothing in our proposals would abridge
these rights. Victims would not have to enter mediation, for example,
particularly if they felt threatened or uncomfortable. Our point is simply
that victims now have no structured opportunity to meet with defendants,
express forgiveness, and heal. This hurts both parties. Many states do allow
victims to speak at sentencing, but as noted earlier, sentencing is not
structured to allow direct, open interaction. At sentencing both victim and
defendant face forward and speak to the judge. For the defendant to face the
victim, he would literally have to turn his back on the judge.249 Moreover,
sentencing frequently is a drama scripted by lawyers for the benefit of a
judge rather than an opportunity to speak from the heart.
Our approach tries to transcend the criticism that victims’ rights
measures must be vengeful and anti-defendant. Currently, the most that a
victim might do is to argue for a stiff sentence. This focus regrettably turns
victims’ rights into a zero-sum game, as if the only way to make victims
happy is to impose stiffer punishments at the expense of offenders. Victims’
247. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 21-23 (1999)
(discussing victims’ alienation from the criminal justice process); TOBOLOWSKY, supra note 42,
at 36-38 (discussing the continued problems faced by victims in receiving notification of
important proceedings and outcomes in their cases). Prosecutors sometimes consult with victims’
families in deciding whether to seek the death penalty, though even here consultation may be
sporadic or even limited to the families of victims who are white. See PREJEAN, supra note 17, at
240 (citing DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., CHATTAHOOCHEE JUDICIAL DISTRICT: BUCKLE OF THE
DEATH BELT: THE DEATH PENALTY IN MICROCOSM (1991), at “Victims’ Families: A Contrast in
Black and White,” available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=45&did=540).
248. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b) (2000); see also Beloof, supra note 31, at 289 & n.2, 294
& n.29 (noting that the vast majority of states enshrine victims’ rights in their constitutions or
statutes and that these rights typically guarantee fairness, dignity, and respect by giving victims
notice, the right to attend, and the right to speak with prosecutors and judges, and that they
sometimes also include rights to privacy and protection).
249. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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rights to participate could be more constructive, however. Studies suggest
that most victims are far less vengeful and punitive than most lawyers
assume.250 Empirical research finds that victims criticize the criminal justice
system not because it is too lenient but because they have few rights and
play little role in the process.251
Victims do not want vengeance so much as additional rights to
participate. First, and above all else, they would like information about their
cases.252 In one survey, more than four-fifths of victims thought it very
important to receive information about arrests, grand jury proceedings, bail,
and release dates.253 While 83% of people surveyed considered it very
important for victims to be informed, officials tell few victims of arrests,
and only 42% of those victims are kept informed of police investigations.254
Even those who learn of a suspect’s arrest rarely receive notice of most
further proceedings.255 Nor do many receive notice of their rights to make
statements and discuss cases with prosecutors.256

250. See Lucia Zedner, Victims, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 419, 443-44
(Mike Maguire et al. eds., 2002).
251. See BHARAT B. DAS, VICTIMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 126-27, 131 (1997);
JO-ANNE M. WEMMERS, VICTIMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19, 207-08 (1996); Joanna
Shapland, Victims and the Criminal Justice System, in FROM CRIME POLICY TO VICTIM POLICY:
REORIENTING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 210, 213 (Ezzat A. Fattah ed., 1986); Strang & Sherman,
supra note 42, at 18-25.
252. See WEMMERS, supra note 251, at 19 (“The informational needs of victims are often
identified as the most common need of all victims.”); Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 20
(“Victims repeatedly say that one of the greatest sources of frustration to them is the difficulty in
finding out from criminal justice authorities about developments in their cases. Indeed, some
victims have said that is all they want from the justice system and would be satisfied simply to
achieve that goal.” (footnote omitted)).
253. DEAN G. KILPATRICK ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS—DOES LEGAL
PROTECTION MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 4 (Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Research in Brief, NCJ 173839,
1998), available at http://ncjrs.org/pdffiles/173839.pdf.
254. JOHN M. BOYLE, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS/E. REG’L CONFERENCE, CRIME ISSUES IN
THE NORTHEAST 3 (1999), available at http://www.csgeast.org/pdfs/cv.project.report.pdf (giving
data from 1998 survey of over 4000 members of the public in nine Northeastern states); see also
Council of State Gov’ts/E. Reg’l Conference, Sentencing Policy and Victims’ Rights,
http://www.csgeast.org/crimrights.asp (last visited Sept. 4, 2004) (containing data set for survey).
255. DAS, supra note 251, at 126-27, 131; KILPATRICK ET AL., supra note 253, at 4 exhibit 1
(reporting that bond-hearing notification rates are approximately 42% to 63%, bail notification
rates are approximately 26% to 38%, sentencing-hearing notification rates are about 30% to 56%,
parole-hearing notification rates are 35% to 70%, plea-negotiation notification rates are 53% to
58%, and charge-dismissal notification rates are 39% to 42%, and noting that, in each case, the
lower figure is the rate in states with weak victims’ rights laws and the higher figure is the rate in
states with strong victims’ rights laws).
256. KILPATRICK ET AL., supra note 253, at 5 exhibit 2 (reporting that victims are notified of
the following rights at the following rates: 47% to 71% are told that victim services are available,
41% to 70% are told of their right to discuss their cases with the prosecutor, 42% to 72% are told
of their right to make victim-impact statements, and 36% to 62% are told of their right to make
victim-impact statements at parole hearings, and noting that, in each case, the lower figure is the
rate in states with weak victims’ rights laws and the higher figure is the rate in states with strong
victims’ rights laws).
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Second, many victims want to participate in their cases beyond simply
testifying as witnesses.257 More than 75% of victims in the survey just
mentioned thought it very important to be involved or heard in bail
hearings, dismissals of charges, plea discussions, parole hearings, and
sentencings.258 “[A]lthough victims’ desire is to be included in the criminal
justice process, they have no desire to take control of the case.”259 Rather,
simply by taking part, victims begin to recover emotionally, counteracting
the alienation and powerlessness they may feel.260
Third, victims value emotional healing and apology.261 Most victims
want to tell offenders how their crimes affected them and hear offenders
answer their questions about the offense.262 Confronting the offender in
person is an important component of this emotional interaction. One victim
who went through mediation said, “I liked that the kid had to look me in the
eyes.”263 Another said, “I guess being able to meet him face to face and
realize that he was just a kid who made a mistake was what I liked the
most.”264 Face-to-face mediation reassures victims, greatly reducing their
fears that the offender will victimize them again.265 Victims want face-toface apologies so that they can understand why their crimes happened to
them, release their anger, and regain a sense of control and self-esteem.266
When offenders accept responsibility, express remorse, and apologize,
victims can more easily heal, reconcile, and forgive.267
Fourth, victims often desire monetary restitution.268 While victims’
rights laws purport to guarantee it, fewer than twenty percent of victims in
fact receive any restitution.269 Typically, the problem is not that defendants

257. JOANNA SHAPLAND ET AL., VICTIMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 176-78 (1985);
Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 21-22.
258. KILPATRICK ET AL., supra note 253, at 4.
259. WEMMERS, supra note 251, at 208.
260. Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 21.
261. HEATHER STRANG, REPAIR OR REVENGE: VICTIMS AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 88-118
(2002); Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 22-23.
262. UMBREIT, supra note 200, at 165, 188; Mark S. Umbreit, Mediating Victim-Offender
Conflict: From Single-Site to Multi-Site Analysis in the U.S., in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ON TRIAL:
PITFALLS AND POTENTIALS OF VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION: INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH
PERSPECTIVES 431, 433 tbl.1 (Heinz Messmer & Hans-Uwe Otto eds., 1991) (noting that ninetytwo percent of victims who went through mediation thought that telling offenders about their
crimes and hearing offenders answer their questions was important, far more than the seventy-six
percent who emphasized their desire for financial compensation).
263. Umbreit, supra note 262, at 433.
264. Id.
265. UMBREIT, supra note 200, at 189.
266. Petrucci, supra note 66, at 351-52, 354-56.
267. See Marilyn R. McNamara & Mandeep K. Dhami, The Role of Apology in Restorative
Justice 6-7, 9 (June 1-4, 2003), http://www.sfu.ca/cfrj/fulltext/mcnamara.pdf.
268. Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 23-24.
269. KILPATRICK ET AL., supra note 253, at 6.
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are poor, but that officials know little about the right to restitution, victims’
economic losses, or defendants’ assets.270
Finally, victims want procedural fairness and respect.271 This sense of
fairness depends more on authorities’ efforts to include victims in the
process than on case outcomes.272 Victims may complain, for example, that
police seemed unhelpful or unsympathetic.273
Except for restitution, these benefits come at little material cost to
offenders. True, offenders may find apologizing uncomfortable, but
apologies may cleanse their consciences as well as heal and reconcile
victims. These various goods that victims want reinforce one another. The
more victims can follow their cases and have procedural opportunities to
interact with offenders, the more openings for remorse and apology there
are. And the more remorse and apology they receive, the more victims feel
respected and the more likely they may be to receive restitution (pursuant to
a mediation agreement).
To promote remorse and apology, criminal procedure should let victims
participate more actively in all parts of the criminal process and apprise
them of their rights to do so. Victim-offender mediation, discussed in
Section B, is one way to give victims a greater role. Another is to offer
opportunities for offenders, with court supervision and victims’ consent, to
communicate with victims and make restitution before sentencing. A third
is to give victims the right to speak with or question offenders at trial or
plea hearings and at sentencing. Victims could also have the right to
respond to offenders’ statements at plea hearings and at sentencing. For
example, a robbery victim might challenge the offender’s suggestion that
his problem with alcohol or drugs forced him to commit a mugging. These
challenges might break down denials and evasions, leading to more
complete catharsis and closure. Indeed, George Fletcher would go so far as
to give victims the right to veto plea bargains and to question prosecution
and defense witnesses at trial.274 But victims need not be in the driver’s
seat. Simply giving them the chance to speak and perhaps question will
help them to feel respected and heard.

270. Id. at 6, 9-10 (also suggesting that criminal justice officials sometimes view restitution
as inappropriate).
271. See Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 24-25.
272. WEMMERS, supra note 251, at 208.
273. DAS, supra note 251, at 123.
274. FLETCHER, supra note 58, at 193-97, 247-50. We do not embrace this proposal. It goes
too far toward supplanting punishment by ceding actual control of prosecutorial actions to the
victim. This would make punishment less a matter of state-imposed suffering to reaffirm the
community’s moral norms and more one of private revenge and redress between individuals. Cf.
DUFF, supra note 66, at 60-64 (contending that crimes are properly understood not simply as
wrongs against victims, but also as public wrongs to which the community should respond).
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Of course, not all of this would be appropriate in the presence of juries.
In addition, trial judges would need to regulate the time and manner of
victim participation to minimize any danger that recalcitrant offenders
might further wound their victims. Trial judges are more than capable of
doing so, however. Notice and an opportunity to be heard, the fundamental
requirements of due process, would empower victims and increase the
opportunities for apology and reconciliation.
E. Fixing Plea Procedures
Right now, guilty plea hearings are often dry recitations of rights and
facts. Judges advise defendants of a laundry list of procedural rights they
are waiving, and defendants answer “yes” to indicate that they understand
each one.275 After that, defendants provide very brief factual statements
explaining what they did,276 which are often written by their lawyers.
Defense lawyers may tell their clients to say that they know they did
something wrong and are sorry. These perfunctory, scripted statements are
far from full apologies. Plea procedures do little else to encourage remorse or
apology, particularly because victims and community members are absent.
These plea hearings could do much more than simply recite rights and
facts. Judges could use their existing authority to truly judge. They could
take the time to observe and evaluate defendants. Defendants often deny or
minimize their behavior or offer excuses.277 Judges could keep them honest
by questioning them closely, probing their excuses, and refusing to accept
pleas if defendants denied or evaded guilt.278 For example, they could ask
questions about defendants’ statements during the crime, how victims
appeared at the crime, the harm inflicted, and the use of force or weapons.
These questions could elicit spontaneous responses from defendants,
breaking them away from scripted statements drafted by their lawyers.
They would also draw attention to the impact of the crime on the victim and
reveal defendants’ awareness of and attitudes or indifference toward
victims. Judges could probe defendants’ explanations for their behavior,
their remorse or sorrow, and their willingness to apologize sincerely or
grudgingly. For example, a judge could challenge a rapist’s insinuation that
the victim consented to sex or was asking for sex by flirting or wearing
provocative clothing. If victims were present and took part in plea hearings,

275. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)-(c) (requiring judges to advise defendants of a list of
rights at guilty plea colloquies).
276. See, e.g., id. 11(b)(3) (requiring a factual basis before a court may accept entry of a
guilty plea).
277. See Bibas, supra note 10, at 1393-94.
278. Id. at 1407-08 (proposing restricting or abolishing Alford and nolo contendere pleas).
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as suggested in the previous Section, judges could encourage dialogue
between the parties. Judges could encourage victims to describe the crime
from their perspectives, compare them with the defendants’ versions, and
listen to defendants’ reactions. Some defendants would deny, hedge, or
minimize responsibility; others might be resigned or remorseful; still others
would openly apologize. Of course, defendants or victims might refuse to
participate. But if they participated, the result might be reconciliation,
healing, and closure. Judges might also learn information that would be
useful at sentencing, as the next Section discusses. To make sure that
sentencing judges have this information, federal courts should end the
common practice of farming out guilty plea colloquies to magistrates.279
Instead, the judge who will sentence should hear the plea colloquy.
One could imagine going further and empanelling a plea jury. The plea
jury could perhaps question defendants (via the judge or prosecutor),
probing their statements. The plea jury’s main function, however, would be
symbolic, representing the community wounded by the crime.280 Perhaps
the idea of plea juries is too cumbersome to replicate broadly. But for
serious violent crimes, where identifiable victims have been badly hurt, the
experiment might be worth trying.
F. Sentencing
The one place where remorse and apology currently appear in the
American criminal justice system is at sentencing. At sentencing,
defendants sometimes express sorrow and apologize, and victims
sometimes air their suffering and forgive. By and large, however,
sentencing is not well structured to promote remorse and apology. In
theory, a judge can tailor the sentence to reflect a defendant’s degree of
sincere remorse and repentance. Even the most rigid sentencing scheme
(the federal one) gives judges discretion to award standardized sentence
discounts for acceptance of responsibility.281 In practice, however, most
279. See id. at 1410 n.246 (collecting citations to federal cases in which federal district courts
referred guilty plea hearings to magistrates).
280. Jason Mazzone has proposed a similar mechanism for a different purpose: plea panels
with broad power to investigate the voluntariness and fairness of proposed plea bargains. Jason
Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 874-78 (2003). This searching inquiry
would likely be too burdensome to apply broadly, greatly expanding the time and expense
required for each plea. Moreover, lay jurors may have neither the ability nor the inclination to
second-guess the prosecution’s behavior in obtaining pleas. Lay jurors, by contrast, are perfectly
suited to represent the wounded community and to seek remorse and apology.
281. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2003). The Supreme Court is
currently considering whether to invalidate the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in United States v.
Booker, No. 04-104 (U.S. filed July 21, 2004), and United States v. Fanfan, No. 04-105 (U.S.
filed July 21, 2004). The Court’s decision should not affect our point. Even though the Supreme
Court has restricted judges’ ability to find aggravating facts unilaterally, it has not questioned
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federal judges award these discounts almost automatically for guilty pleas,
no matter how grudgingly the defendant admits guilt or how little remorse
he shows.282 Likewise, while state sentencing schemes preserve judges’
discretion to adjust sentences, judges use their discretion not to reward
remorse but to reward efficiency regardless of remorse. Anecdotal studies
show that judges reward guilty pleas with sentence discounts not because
these offenders are more contrite but because they spare the court’s time.283
We see arguments both ways on whether and how judges should
consider remorse and apology in determining sentences. One argument is
that remorse and apology are valuable only as free, unprompted expressions
of conscience. Ideally, offenders should apologize for apology’s sake rather
than out of a mercenary desire to reap lower sentences. Indeed, that is
exactly what happened in medieval and colonial times: A criminal would
confess, apologize, reconcile with the community, and then hang from the
gallows that day or the next.284 Commodifying an apology can subvert and
cheapen it, watering down its force and encouraging insincere, selfinterested apologies.285 Furthermore, it is not easy to measure sincere
remorse and apology, as many offenders feign remorse to reap sentence
discounts.286
On the other hand, these practical objections could just as easily apply
to other metrics for punishment. An offender’s blameworthiness, need for
specific deterrence or incapacitation, and amenability to rehabilitation
require careful factfinding. Offenders often falsely portray themselves as
less blameworthy, more peaceful, or more virtuous than they are, yet we
trust sentencing judges to discern their sincerity and honesty.
Blameworthiness, peacefulness, and virtue are not objectively verifiable
facts any more than remorse—the practical factfinding problems are no
judges’ power to award mitigating adjustments, such as acceptance-of-responsibility discounts.
See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537-40 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 481, 490 n.16 (2000).
282. See supra note 18.
283. See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS,
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 134, 144-48 (1978) (noting that judges tend to rubber-stamp
plea agreements primarily to promote efficiency and clear their dockets); Albert W. Alschuler,
The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652, 661-69 (1981) (explaining that,
while a few defendants go to trial because they are defiant or in denial, most pleas are motivated
not by remorse but by pragmatic recognition that they earn substantial sentencing discounts).
284. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY 16-23, 42 (2002) (describing repentance,
confession, and reconciliation as central elements of and justifications for capital punishment
around 1700); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 43, 4950 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1975) (same, in the 18th century);
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 26 (1993) (“The
condemned were expected to play the role of the penitent sinner; it was best of all if they offered a
final confession, a prayer, and affirmed their faith, in the very shadow of the gallows.”).
285. See Taft, supra note 14, at 1156-57.
286. See O’Hear, supra note 7, at 1555; see also supra text accompanying note 75.
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more daunting here. Indeed, anyone who has ever attended a smattering of
sentencing hearings is familiar with a variety of behavior: Even when they
have an incentive at sentencing to seem remorseful, some offenders remain
in denial. Some continue to make excuses for their conduct. Some stiffly
read statements written by their lawyers. And some display real emotion
and make heartfelt apologies. Judges must gauge sincerity, but this task is
similar to trusting judges or juries to determine witnesses’ credibility.
The harder objection is the theoretical one. Is an expression of remorse
and apology induced by the hope of sentence discounts worthless? We are
inclined to think not. Even insincere remorse and apologies may be better
than none at all. Such expressions vindicate victims, drive home awareness
of wrongs, and may ultimately lead offenders to internalize that awareness.
People are reluctant to apologize when they think they are in the right, in
part because expressing remorse is a step towards accepting and believing
it.287 The very act of apologizing teaches, which explains why parents make
their children apologize (grudgingly) for hitting a sibling or taking a toy.288
In other words, the ordeal of expressing remorse and apologizing, even if
done initially for the wrong reasons, may in time promote genuine
repentance.289 Furthermore, victims may find even half-hearted apologies
satisfying, as they vindicate victims and humble offenders.290 This explains
why victims negotiate for confessions and apologies as part of settlements
or plea bargains, even though the apology is an obvious quid pro quo.291

287. See Bibas, supra note 10, at 1399, 1399-400 (“[E]ven feigned or induced repentance
may teach lessons to some offenders[, which can] heighten[] the defendant’s awareness of the
victim’s injury, the norm violated, and the community’s condemnation. Indeed, the ordeal of
feigning repentance, even if initially done for the wrong reasons, can sometimes lead to genuine
repentance.” (footnote omitted)); Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, supra note 9, at 1850.
288. Bibas, supra note 10, at 1399 n.197 (noting also that cognitive-dissonance theory
teaches that persons who speak things that they do not fully believe are inclined to update their
attitudes to bring them into harmony with their statements). While a few apologies may be so
transparently insincere as to be offensive, or are immediately repudiated, most vindicate the
victim and repudiate the wrong done and thus do some good.
289. Id. at 1399-400.
290. See DUFF, supra note 66, at 94-95 (noting that “an apology whose sincerity is doubtful
or unknown can still have value,” that “apologies can have a ritual or formalized character,” and
that “between strangers it might be enough that the apology is made—that the ritual is
undertaken”).
291. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 10, at 1407 n.234 (reporting cases in which victim or
victim’s family insisted on an admission of guilt as a condition of a plea bargain); Taft, supra note
14, at 1146; Alan Bernstein, Coleman Fined, Issues Apology in Assault Case, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Oct. 11, 2001, at A33 (reporting that victim of a shoving incident “approved Wednesday’s plea
bargaining because it included an apology,” according to the prosecutor); William Brand, SLA
Members Face 6-8 Years in Prison; ‘1970s Revolutionary Group’ Pleads Guilty to 2nd-Degree
Murder in 27-Year-Old Slaying, OAKLAND (Cal.) TRIB., Nov. 8, 2002, available at LEXIS, News,
All (English, Full Text) (reporting that a murder victim’s family had agreed to a plea bargain on
condition that the four defendants apologize in court, and noting that the four did apologize to the
victim’s family at sentencing).
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Earlier, we criticized the status quo’s use of remorse and apology at
sentencing as proxies for the need for deterrence and retribution. We argued
that remorse and apology are poor proxies for future dangerousness and
blameworthiness and that sentence discounts may undermine general
deterrence.292 While deterrence and retribution are legitimate guideposts for
sentencing, they do not exhaust the roles of remorse and apology. The other
benefits of remorse and apology still justify taking them into account at
sentencing, even if there is some tradeoff of general deterrence and little
impact on specific deterrence and retribution. Moreover, our criticism of
deterrence centered on the narrow, classical view of deterrence as making
the expected pain of punishment exceed the pleasure of the crime.293
Apology and remorse fit much more comfortably with a social-meaning
approach to deterrence, such as Kahan’s. By reinforcing the social norms
violated and morally condemning crimes, apology and remorse may teach
moral values and discourage crime in the long run.294
If remorse and apology should carry weight at sentencing, courts need
more flexibility and information to consider healing as an adjunct to
punishment. First, they need flexibility to adjust plea discounts instead of
having to apply one-size-fits-all rewards for guilty pleas. Even under
longstanding federal law, courts could give the lowest sentences to
offenders who make unqualified apologies. In contrast, they could impose
full sentences on those who do not apologize at all or who make excuses
and award partial reductions for those in between. To make these decisions
intelligently, the judge who imposes sentence should be the same one who
heard the trial or plea and should have the transcript of any victim-offender
mediation sessions.
One could even imagine having sentencing juries, at least in serious
violent cases, to represent the conscience of the wounded community. This
approach dovetails with the Supreme Court’s decision that juries rather than
judges must find defendants eligible for the death penalty.295 Time and
money constraints, however, would probably limit sentencing juries to
serious violent crimes, where the need for them might be greatest.296
292. See supra Section II.A.
293. The classic exponent of this position is Jeremy Bentham. See BENTHAM, supra note 79,
at 170 & n.1.
294. See Kahan, supra note 9, at 603-04 (noting that Kahan’s expressive theory of
punishment can reinforce deterrence by shaping people’s preferences through moral education).
295. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
296. See supra text accompanying note 280. But cf. supra note 55 (collecting law review
articles that propose jury sentencing).
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions have mandated some role for jury fact-finding in
determinate sentencing. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In practice, however, legislatures and prosecutors are likely to
circumvent juries through plea bargaining, redrafted sentencing guidelines, and more mandatory
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The process should not end at sentencing. As Section II.C notes,
Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota encourage victim-offender mediation in
prison. After living with the burden of their guilt, offenders who persist in
denial may apologize later. While we have been unable to find quantitative
data on the success of these programs, they appear promising. Scholars
should investigate further, and policymakers should consider replicating
them on a larger scale.
G. Costs and Difficulties of Implementing Remorse and Apology
A few caveats are in order. We recognize that remorse and apology will
not always work. Some offenders will remain defiant. Some suffer from
psychopathy, which impairs the capacity to empathize and so feel
remorse.297 Some victims will be rationally or irrationally fearful of meeting
with their offenders and reliving the trauma. And some—although
surprisingly few298—may care little about such expressions and may want
only vengeance. Remorse and apology are harder to orchestrate for socalled victimless crimes, such as low-level drug possession crimes, tax
evasion, or perjury. So, too, certain inchoate crimes, such as conspiracy,

minimum sentences, and many states still use discretionary sentencing. See supra text
accompanying notes 281-283. Thus, juries are unlikely to play a major role in most cases. See
Stephanos Bibas, Blakely’s Federal Aftermath, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 333, 338-39 (2004).
After sentencing, one might also consider time limits on the civil disabilities that confront
convicted felons, such as disenfranchisement. Some felons, those guilty of the most serious
felonies, may face death or life imprisonment. But most will reenter society, and society must
consider when to reintegrate and reconcile with them, to symbolically encourage healing and
redemption. Perhaps those who demonstrate remorse and apologize show their willingness to turn
over a new leaf, and their civil disabilities should end at some point after their parole or probation
ends. See generally Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV.
65, 67 nn.4-5 (2003) (discussing service by felons on juries and collecting citations to articles
discussing disenfranchisement of felons).
297. For general treatments of psychopathy and how it impairs the conscience and the
capacity to empathize and feel remorse, see generally HERVEY CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF
SANITY: AN ATTEMPT TO REINTERPRET THE SO-CALLED PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY 239-47
(1941); and ROBERT D. HARE, WITHOUT CONSCIENCE: THE DISTURBING WORLD OF THE
PSYCHOPATHS AMONG US 40-46 (1999). Psychopaths may be able to feign remorse to manipulate
the system to gain lenient treatment. See, e.g., Dave Cullen, The Depressive and the Psychopath:
At Last We Know Why the Columbine Killers Did It, SLATE, Apr. 20, 2004,
http://slate.msn.com/id/2099203/ (explaining that Columbine school shooters Eric Harris, who
was a psychopath, and Dylan Klebold feigned remorse as part of a diversion program for an
earlier property crime).
298. See Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 18 (“While individual victims may be angry
and initially seek vengeance, surveys have repeatedly found that most victims do not have these
feelings.”). An individual victim’s potential vengeful inclinations, of course, are a concern for any
proposal that gives victims a role in the criminal process, not just ours. In light of the small
percentage of victims who harbor these feelings and the proposed supervision of victims’ and
offenders’ participation, this possibility presents little cause for alarm.
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often do not concretely harm any readily identifiable victims.299 It may be
possible, however, to treat affected community residents as victims, as
many so-called victimless or inchoate crimes have palpable effects on
neighborhoods and communities.300 Like victimless crimes, other crimes
will have a diffuse impact on a large group of people, as when a corporation
recklessly poisons a neighborhood creek. Demands for corporate apologies
are becoming quite prevalent, and the desire for apologies confirms
apology’s power even for less discrete crimes.301 Evidently, apology is
powerful and desirable even if it must be addressed to a broad audience or
to a representative sample of all victims. For example, a corporate
embezzler could apologize in person to a sample of corporate employees
and shareholders and include a written apology in the company’s annual
report.
Remorse and apology may vary depending on the cultural context and
social fabric. In some neighborhoods, the social fabric may be weaker and
so harder to mend. Some offenders, such as aliens who are to be deported,
cannot be reintegrated into society. Some offenders’ and victims’
relationships are nonexistent or badly frayed and difficult to repair.
Remorse and apology can nonetheless vindicate victims, teach them that the
crimes were not their fault, and heal both victims and offenders. Remorse
and apology may be most powerful in small, close-knit communities and
homogeneous cultures.302 But even in large, heterogeneous communities,
remorse and apology still hold some power; in large American cities people
also care about their relationships and reputations.303
Moreover, encouraging remorse and apology takes time and money.
More time and money spent here means less elsewhere, with fewer crimes
299. This is by no means true for all inchoate crimes. Attempted murders, attempted
muggings, attempted burglaries, and the like all cause at least psychological (if not physical or
monetary) harm to easily ascertainable victims. Victims of such attempts, like victims of
completed crimes, will be proper objects of remorse and apology for both their own and their
offenders’ sakes. See, e.g., supra note 185 and accompanying text (noting example of a successful
mediation session between an attempted murderer and his victim).
300. See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 66, at 113 (noting that for crimes that injure the community,
the offender owes the wider community “an apology that recognizes the nature and seriousness of
the wrong done”); id. at 162 (“[Where] there is no individual victim who could take part in the
[criminal mediation] process . . . the negotiation must be between the offender and the community
as a whole . . . .”).
301. See, e.g., Lisa Bannon, Slave-Labor Suit Targets Japanese Firms; Case Alleges That
Mitsui and Mitsubishi Abused Chinese in World War II, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2000, at A18;
Martin J. Moylan, Travel Group Presses Northwest for Apology, DULUTH (Minn.) NEWS-TRIB.,
Jan. 20, 2004, available at 2004 WL 56722804.
302. See Massaro, supra note 68, at 1916-17.
303. See DUFF, supra note 66, at 93 (noting that, even where victim and offender are not
directly or previously related, “[r]econciliation is still valuable since it restores those bonds of
citizenship, of mutual respect and concern, that the crime damaged”); Whitman, supra note 193,
at 1068, 1064-68 (arguing that shaming sanctions are “likely to work . . . even in a modern,
western, urban society,” because they will still “have a real psychic impact”).
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and defendants investigated, prosecuted, and convicted. Giving a
meaningful role to offenders, victims, and communities means loosening
the control of prosecutors and defense lawyers. These are real costs, but the
value of remorse and apology may well outweigh them. At the very least,
we should begin to discuss when these costs are worthwhile.
Other critics will object that remorse and apology seem like
communitarian impositions of morality in our libertarian political culture.
While it is important as a rule to respect citizens’ freedom of conscience,
offenders have proven by their criminal acts that they do not respect
victims’ rights. The criminal justice system already tries to teach them
lessons, whether through a crude cost-benefit deterrence calculus or through
rehabilitation. Encouraging offenders to learn the value of the rights they
have violated by asking them to acknowledge and repudiate their crimes
hardly seems a totalitarian invasion of conscience. This is particularly true
because the lesson taught is limited to that narrow set of acts that society
has defined as crimes. Offenders and victims, moreover, are always free to
refuse to participate.
Of course apology will not be a panacea, and of course there will be
practical problems, such as divining sincerity and coaxing offenders and
victims to meet. Including the community will also take some work; news
articles could publicize apologies to the affected community, and
community representatives could attend court proceedings. Lawyers who
are used to litigation will take some time to warm up to mediation, just as
they have done in the civil context. Once sentencing benefits, evidentiary
privileges, and procedural reforms encourage this mediation, lawyers may
slowly learn how to benefit their clients by using these new tools. Properly
done, remorse and apology can supplement our traditional adversary
criminal process without supplanting its procedures, rights, and duties.
CONCLUSION
Lawyers, schooled in law and economics, are taught to evaluate
settlements from a rational-actor perspective. We add up the monetary
benefits, subtract the monetary costs, and arrive at a net present value. Of
course, monetary costs and benefits matter a great deal, and
consequentialism is certainly relevant. But the ordinary person does not
evaluate crime and punishment that way.304 Blame, status, and expressive
concerns matter to the ordinary person, and crime estranges offenders from
304. Cf. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New
Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 96-101, 121-22 (1997) (finding that lawyers
are less susceptible to framing effects than nonlawyers and attributing this difference to lawyers’
training in measuring the expected economic value of various options).
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victims and society. Criminal punishment is one essential part of balancing
the scales of justice, but it is not the only part. Offenders should also realize
the wrongfulness of their acts, feel sorrow for their misdeeds, and accept
responsibility. If offenders can express remorse to victims and ask their
forgiveness, they humble themselves and thereby come clean. This humility
teaches offenders valuable moral lessons. If encouraged in the right way,
remorse and apology can help offenders cleanse their consciences and
return to the moral fold. It can also touch victims, allowing them to achieve
catharsis, let go of their anger, and forgive.
More generally, criminal procedure can broaden its horizons beyond
the narrow procedural values of efficiency, accuracy, and procedural
fairness. It can take account of the social and relational dimensions of
criminal wrongdoing. Substantive values such as moral education,
catharsis, healing, and reconciliation should inform procedural choices. In
the case of remorse and apology, about which the criminal law cares
deeply, procedure can and should make more room for the substantive
values that these expressions serve. Victims should have more opportunities
for face-to-face, dyadic interaction with offenders, especially through
mediation and similar mechanisms. Prosecutors and defense counsel should
warm to the social and psychological benefits of remorse and apology.
They should encourage and use these expressions throughout the criminal
process, from informal resolution early on to more effective plea
agreements to better use of cooperating witnesses at trial. Plea and
sentencing procedures themselves should look beyond the offender’s
individual badness. They should take greater account of the social,
psychological, and relational aspects of crime by making room for remorse
and apology and involving victims and community members. Procedure, in
short, should serve substance instead of ignoring its goals.
Remorse and apology are fundamentally moral, and the law cannot
force them. Offenders and victims enjoy freedom of conscience, and they
have the right to remain defiant. But the law can remove roadblocks to
remorse, provide opportunities and venues, and encourage offenders and
victims to speak face to face. Prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges can
all come to see themselves as players in a human moral drama and not
simply as assembly-line processors of fungible, criminally disposed
individuals. Perhaps this vision is idealistic, but the examples of civil and
victim-offender mediation show that reality can pursue the ideal in at least
some cases. The criminal justice system should aspire to these ideals even if
it cannot implement them overnight.

